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ABSTRACT

In the past two decades, the organized and systematic
theft of a state's wealth and resources by its leaders has
reached unprecedented levels in developing and lessdeveloped states. Unlike previous acts of embezzlement by
political leaders, this new wave of corruption-referredto as
indigenous spoliation-involves billions of dollars and causes
widespread social and economic devastation. This Article
defines indigenous spoliationand presents some examples of
this practice. The author describes the inadequacy of
domestic law in dealing with the problem and suggests that
internationallaw should provide a remedy. Next, the author
proposes a framework for holding persons involved in acts of
spoliation individually liable. The author then contends that
the international community, through a multilateral treaty,
could enforce a prohibition against spoliation by imposing
enforcement obligations on individual states. Additionally,
the availability offoreign aid and commercial bank creditsfor
developing states could be conditioned on these states
proscribing acts of spoliation. The author encourages victim
states to change their domestic laws to address spoliation
and asserts that indigenous spoliationshould be treated as a
violation of human rights.

*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University (S.M.U.) School of Law;
Ph.D., J.D. (Northwestern); Member of the Illinois Bar; Solicitor and Advocate of

the Supreme Court of Cameroon; Associate Editor, The InternationalLaunjer. The
author wishes to extend special thanks to the following present and former
students at S.M.U. School of Law for their research assistance: David Kane and
Cecile Labega, J.D. 1994; Alan Dorantes, Sheila Fuqua, and Karen Jane Sanchez,
J.D. 1993; Jim Beiderman, Debi Davis, and Revathi Venkatappan, J.D. 1991, as
well as Donna Santiago, Esq. and Ms. Dawn Kepets. The author also wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of Bruce Muck in the Underwood Law Library and the
secretarial support readily and freely given by Ms. Carolyn Yates.

46

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:45

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
I.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................
THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES .......................

A.
B.

III.

62
62
63

66

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW ON INDIGENOUS
SPOLIATION ............................................................

68

A.

68

B.
IV.

A Definitionof Indigenous Spoliation...........
The InternationalDimension of Indigenous
Spoliation..................................................
1.
Stress and Strain on Interstate
Relations ........................................
2.
Failed Efforts to Contain CrossBorder Refugee Flows .....................
3.
The Consequences of Cross-Border
Refugee Flows: Compassion Fatigue
and Violent Backlash Against
Foreigners ......................................

48
56
56

The Case Law............................................
1.
The Defense of Forum Non
Conveniens .....................................
2.
The Act of State Doctrine ................
The Act of State Doctrine as a Defense in
Spoliation Cases........................................

68
69
70

THE DOCTRINE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY:

ITS ORIGINS, CONTENT, AND RELATION TO INDIGENOUS
SPOLIATION .............................................................

A.

PermanentSovereignty and SelfDetermination............................................
1.
The Draft Covenants on Human
Rights ............................................
a.
Second Committee Debates:
1952 ...................................
b.
The Ninth Session of the
General Assembly Debates:
1954 ....................................
c.
The Human Rights
Commission Debates: 1955..
d.
The Third Committee
Debates: 1955 ....................
2.
The Economic and Social Council
Debate on Implementation: 1955 ....

74
75
75
75
76
77
78
79

19951

THE CRIE OFPATRIMONICIDE

3.

B.

V.

The Commission on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources: 1959-61 .......................
4.
Debates Preceding Resolution 1803 ......
5.
Resolution 1803 .............................
6.
Other Developments: 1963-66 ........
a.
Secretary-General's
Report: 1963 ......................
b.
The ECOSOC Session: 1964
c.
The Second Committee's
Session: 1965 .....................
d.
Special Committee
Debate: 1966 ......................
e
The Second Committee's
Session: 1966 ....................
7.
Resolution 2158 .............................
PermanentSovereignty and the Creation of a
New Economic Order..................................
1.
Special Session of the General
Assembly: 1974 .............................
2.
The New International Economic
Order .............................................
3.
The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States ..............................

80
81
82
83
83
83
83
84
84
84
85
86
86
87

TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR HOLDING
CONSTITUTIONALLY RESPONSIBLE RULERS INDIVIDUALLY

LIABLE FOR ACTS OF INDIGENOUS SPOLIATION ...............

88

The Doctrineof IndividualResponsibility......
1.
The Link Between Permanent

88

A.

Sovereignty and Indigenous

Spoliation ......................................
Permanent Sovereignty and the
Public Trust Doctrine .....................
The FiduciaryRelationship and the Public
TrustDoctrine............................................
1.
The Duty of Loyalty ........................
2.
The Duty to Preserve the Trust
Property ..........................................
3.
Application of These Duties in
Spoliation Situations ......................
The FiduciaryRelationship in the
InternationalSphere....................................

92

2.
B.

C.

94
97
97
98
98
100

48

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

VI.

THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ...............

A.

VII.

[VoL 28:45

InternationalComplicity...............................
1.
The Conspiracy of Silence ................
2.
Privileged Treatment for Heads of
State Guilty of Spoliation .................
B.
The Need for a Concerted International
Response to the Problem..............................
1.
The Inability of International Law to
Deter the Perpetrators .....................
2.
Spoliated Capital Invested in
Western Economies .........................
3.
The Absence of Autonomous
Judiciaries in Victim States .............
C.
Some Possible Solutions ..............................
1.
The Multilateral Treaty Approach .....
2.
Proscribing Indigenous Spoliation as
a Condition for Foreign Aid and
Commercial Bank Credits ................
3.
Getting Victim States Involved in the
Prevention and Punishment of
Indigenous Spoliation ......................
4.
Treating Indigenous Spoliation as
More Than a Property Dispute .........
CONCLUSION ...........................................................

102
102
102
104
105
105
107
107
108
108

110

110
113

114

I. INTRODUCTION
Presidential graft and high-level official corruption have
become a permanent factor in the political life of many states.
Their lethal effects on the world economy are so evident that it is
surprising that the international community of scholars and
policymakers have not done more to bring these activities under
international discipline. The slow response to the problem of
indigenous spoliation contrasts sharply with the international
preoccupation with efforts aimed at protecting and preserving

1

In this Article, indigenous spoliation has been defined as an illegal act

of depredation committed for private ends by constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials, or private individuals. See discussion infra pt. II.A.
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3
endangered species, 2 the rain forest, and stolen art. Indeed, international condemnation of the trafficking of stolen cultural
property4 and the steps taken by the community of states to stem

this illicit trade represent the kinds of responses one would have
5
expected for a problem such as indigenous spoliation.

Attempts

See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a)(2)
2.
(1984) (requiring each federal agency to consult with the United States Secretary
of the Interior to insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or
threatened species); see also Michael J. Glennon, Has InternationalLaw Failedthe
Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990); Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra,
Whales: TheirEmerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21 (1991).
The importance of animal preservation is not being downplayed except
3.
to suggest that such efforts must be placed in perspective. The author is a
Cameroonian national whose ethnic group, the Bakweri, live on the slopes of Mt.
Cameroon, the highest mountain in West Africa. The Bakweri are traditionally
hunters and farmers. Fako, as they call their mountain, is where they have their
farms and have done all of their hunting since time immemorial. Fako is also the
home of a variety of wildlife ranging from the lowly porcupine to the majestic
African elephant. Following the traditions of their ancestors, the Bakweri have
hunted and continue to hunt and trap these animals. Recent efforts by the
Cameroon government to use grants from foreign groups to turn the mountain
into a wildlife reserve have met with bewilderment and resistance from the
Bakweri. They cannot understand how the source of their livelihood, their very
existence, could be taken away from them in the name of wildlife preservation.
The point of this narrative is to underscore the fact that definitions of human
rights are culture-bound, and conflicts in values arise when one tries to impose
one culture's definition of human rights on that of another culture. The inevitable
clash between the Bakweri and the Cameroon government stems from the
attempt to juxtapose the so-called universal human right to a quality environment
with the right of peoples to pursue their traditional practices without outside
interference. Preserving all the elephants in Mt. Cameroon will not change the
quality of life of the vast majority of the Cameroonian population if at the same

time its rulers are emptying the national treasury and carting the money to banks
in Europe and the United States. The author can speak with authority for the
Bakweri of Cameroon who are resisting government efforts to turn their hunting
ground into a wildlife preservation. The Bakweri see such attempts as an
infringement on some of their basic human rights. Whose values and judgment
should prevail: the universalist who states the case for all mankind or the
communalist who retorts that the universalist cannot speak for the people? For
an examination of how these issues have dramatically played out in a court of
law, see for example, Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) 175 C.L.R. 1 (1992) (Austl.). In
Mabo, the High Court of Australia held that Australia was not terra nullius when
first occupied and that significant pre-settlement indigenous land rights
continued to exist under the common law of Australia. See G.P.J. McGinley,
Natural Resource Companies and Aboriginal Title to Land: The Australian
Experience-Mabo and its Aftermath, 28 IN"LtL. LAW. 695 (1994).
See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Declaration Decision of Curators of the
4.
University Museum, University of Pennsylvania (April 1, 1970); The Harvard
Report (November 29, 1971).
See Leslie S. Potter & Bruce Zagaris, Toward a Common U.S.-Mexican
5.
CulturalHeritage: The Need for a Regional Americas Initiative in the Recovery and
Return of Stolen Cultural Property, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 627 (1992); Report on
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have even been made to criminalize the illicit taking and movement of cultural property6 and to define it as an international

crime in the Draft International Criminal Code. 7 Restrictions on
the export and import of stolen cultural objects-usually from
culturally rich but economically poor states to comparatively artpoor but economically wealthy market states 8 -have taken the
form of multilateral 9 and bilateral treaties, 1 0 as well as domestic
legislation. 1 If the plunder of cultural assets can prompt international concern, then the organized and systematic theft of a
state's economic wealth and resources by its leaders deserves no
less. Why then has the discussion of this problem been ceded to

National Legal Control of Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property, Lyndel V. Prott & PJ.
O'Keefe, UNESCO, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. CLT-83/WS/16 (1983); and Halina Ni~c,
Legislative Models of Protectionof CulturalProperty,27 HASTINGS L.J. 1089 (1976).
6.
See James A.R. Nafziger, InternationalPenalAspects of Crimes against
Cultural Property and the Protection of Cultural Property, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 525 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1986).
7.
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNAT1ONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CRIMINAL CODE 98-99 (1980).

A DRAFr

8.
See John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About CulturalProperty,
80 AM. J. INrL L. 831 (1986).
9.
See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970,
UNESCO, 10 1.L.M. 289 (1971) (the first global agreement regarding international
trade in illicit cultural objects); Convention on the Protection of the
Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, June 16,
1976, 15 I.L.M. 1350 (1976); European Cultural Convention, December 19,
1954, art. 5, 218 U.N.T.S. 139; European Convention on the Protection of the
Archaeological Heritage, May 6, 1969, 788 U.N.T.S. 227, 8 I.L.M. 736 (1969);
European Convention on Offenses Relating to Cultural Property, June 23, 1985,
25 I.L.M. 44.
10.
See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059; Treaty

on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., S. TREA1Y DOC. No.
100-13, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 27 I.L.M. 443 (1988).
11.
For the United States, see Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental
or Architectural Sculpture or Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (Supp. II, 1972);
Convention on Cultural Property, 19 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq. (1983); National Stolen
Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1990) (prohibiting transportation or receipt,
in interstate or foreign commerce, of any goods knowingly stolen and worth
$5,000 or more); Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
470aa-47011 (1985) (declaring as national property objects located above and
below ground on either public or Indian lands). For Mexico, see Ley Sobre
Proteccion y Conservacion de Monumentos y Bellezas Naturales, art. 1, 58 D. 0.
7, (1930) (Mex.); Ley Sobre Proteccion y Conservacion de Monumentos
Arqueologcos e Historicos, Poblaciones Tipicas y Lugares de Belleza Natural, 82
D. 0. 152 (1934) (Mex.); Ley Federal del Patrimonio Cultural de la Nacion, 303 D.
0. 8 (1970) (Mex.); Ley Federal Sobre Monumentos y Zonas Arqueologicos,
Artisticos, e Historicos, 312 D. 0. 16 (1972) (Mex.).
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newspaper columnists, editorial writers, and lawyers representing
successor governments trying to sue in foreign courts to get back
12
some of the spoliated funds?
The apparent neglect of this important subject matter reflects
the nature of the scholarship in this area. Discussions of the
consequences of high-level political corruption in the last two
decades have been shaped by what Laurence Whitehead terms a
realpolitik, or functionalist, stance.1 3 This paradigm, which has
dominated the writings of U.S. political scientists, avoids any
outright condemnation of political corruption, preferring instead a
"balance sheet" approach, which strains to break down the social
Adherents of the
costs and benefits of political corruption.
realpolitik school do not regard corruption as a grave concern

12.

See Lauren Weiner, Recovering Wealth from Dictators Is Not Easy, THE

WASH. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at A7; Bob Drogin, Corruption;Manila Under Firefor
Its Deals on Marcos Assets, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1990, at A3; Rone Tempest, ExDespots Can'tBank on the Swiss, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1990, at 1; Barbara Hetzer,
The Pols & Pariahs;The Wealth That Leaves No Tracks, FORTUNE, Oct. 12, 1987, at
189; Louis Kraar, Where Do You Hide $10 Billion? Aquino Wants to Know,
FORTUNE, Sept. 14, 1987, at 97 (Marcos' "declared net income over 22 years [in
office] was just $224,750"); Frontline- In Search of the Marcos Millions (PBS
television broadcast, May 26, 1987).
At its eighty-first Annual Meeting in 1987, the American Society of International Law broke new ground when it devoted an entire panel to address the
problem of indigenous spoliation. See Abram Chayes, Pursuing the Assets of
Former Dictators, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 81ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIEIY OF INTERNAIONAL LAW 394 (1987) (Michael P. Malloy ed., 1990)
[hereinafter ASIL PROCEEDINGS].
A couple of years later, the remarkable
humanist, Michael Reisman, attempted to draw attention once again to this
scourge. In a brief commentary, Reisman decried the preoccupation of traditional
scholarship with the exploitation of the natural wealth of developing states by
giant multinational corporations while ignoring internal forms of wealth exploitation. As he argued, "[tihe ritual of condemnation of foreign corporations'
spoliations of the resources of developing [states] and their elevation to the level
of international concern have obscured the problem of spoliations by national
officials of the wealth of the states of which they are temporary custodians....
[The effects of this neglect have been much] confusion and paralysis about the
status of national funds spoliated by high government officials and cached
abroad." See W. Michael Reisman, HarnessingInternationalLaw to Restrain and
Recapture Indigenous Spoliations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 56-57 (1989). It was time,
Reisman reasoned, to harness international law to restrain and recapture spoliated wealth. Id. at 56.
13.
See Laurence Whitehead, On presidential graft: the Latin American
evidence, in CORRUPTION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROL 146, 154 (Michael
Clarke ed., 1983). Whitehead's realpolitik school is also referred to as the
functionalist paradigm by other political scientists. See Edward van Roy, On the
Theory of Corruption, 19 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 87 (1970); Arnold J.
Heidenheimer, Introduction, Corruption and Modernization, in POLITICAL
CORRUPHON: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 479 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed.,

1970); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER INCHANGING SOCIErIES 69 (1968).
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because of its purported functional or utilitarian role in any
political system, especially those of developing Third World
states.14 Therefore, the realpolitikschool tends to view corruption
as a lesser of two evils, 1 5 touting its contribution to the
non-violent resolution of social conflicts as one of its beneficial
consequences.16
Accordingly, functionalists posit an inverse relationship between corruption and political instability by arguing that the
average costs of political corruption are likely to diminish over the
life of a regime as it becomes more secure. Thus, a state would
benefit from retaining a corrupt person as president for an
extended period rather than changing presidents fairly frequently
in order to minimize the cost of presidential fortunes. 17 However,
in a system where presidential graft is a way of life, as is the case
in much of the Third World, each change in leadership sets in
motion a wave of corruption because presidents will try to amass
their own fortunes in the shortest possible time.
Others have argued instead that, in embracing this socially
beneficial formulation of corruption, academics have unwittingly
conferred the stamp of respectability on political corruption in
general and presidential graft in particular' 8-an imprimatur that
may very well explain why international policymakers have been
slow to condemn the practice. Yet, to the victims of presidential
graft, there is nothing academic about this pestilence. Soon after

14.
See J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417 (1967). Nye argues that corruption is a

necessary element in the development of emerging Third World states because, in
the early stages of development, these societies lack the essential infrastructures
that make things work. The system becomes dysfunctional only when a middle
class or student population emerges because those groups, more than anyone
else, believe in morality and law. But see Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Bureaucracy
versus Kleptocracy, in POLITICAL CORRUPHON : READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

546 (ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER ed., 1989) (arguing that ldeptocracy has led to
economic anarchy, political instability, and the eventual replacement of
democracy by civilian or military autocracies in many Third World states). At the
time that he wrote his article, Rajaratnam was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Labor of Singapore. As a result, he knew of the destructive effects of high level
corruption.
15.

See Whitehead, supranote 13, at 156.

16.
Id. at 156.
17.
An unidentified supporter of a South American dictator is quoted in
1956 as stating: "It is cheaper for the country that he should be president for life,
because he has made his fortune and is satisfied. When we changed presidents

every few years, the cost of presidential fortunes used to ruin us." Towards a
Grammarof Graft, ECONOMIST, June 15, 1957, at 959.
18.
See Whitehead, supranote 13, at 159.
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becoming Prime Minister of Ghana in 1969, Dr. Kofi Busia-an
Oxford-educated sociologist who himself went down in ignominy a

few years later under the weight of corruption charges leveled

against him1 9-acknowledged

that high-level official corruption

20
For Ghana, as
was the biggest threat to the national economy.
well as numerous other states, longevity in office has never been
known to dampen a president's acquisitive tendencies. Even after
thirty-one years as President of the Dominican Republic Rafael
21
Trujillo's "acquisitiveness was never dimmed by satiation."
Other dictators who rule or have ruled their states for years
without any sign of slowing down their pace of personal
aggrandizement include: Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Ferdinand
Marcos of the Philippines, Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, and
Francois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier and Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc")
Duvalier of Haiti.
To suggest to the citizens of these states that high-level official corruption has some broad redeeming social value invites
their criticism and risks being dismissed as unhinged, for these
human flotsam and jetsam are the immediate casualties of indigenous spoliation.2 2 What would one think of a doctor who devotes

Busia was the target of the Taylor Assets Committee set up by the
19.
National Redemption Council. For a fuller discussion on commissions of inquiry,
see infra notes 29, 255-64, and accompanying text.
See Herbert H. Werlin, The Roots of Corruption-theGhanaianEnquiry,
20.
10 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 247, 251 (1972) (hereinafter Roots of Corruption).

21.

See Whitehead, supranote 13, at 157.

Beginning in December 1993, government employees in Cameroon
22.
went on strike to protest deep salary cuts (between 50% and 70%), unpaid
arrears, and other related grievances. See Memorandum submitted by Public
Service Employees of the South West Province through the Prime Minister, Head
of Government to His Excellency the Head of State, President of the Republic, in
Reaction to the Recent Salary Cuts, Dec. 29, 1993 (on file with author). Much of
the public school system was closed down because striking teachers refused to
teach; the judiciary in some provinces stopped administering justice; and
government hospitals continued their long tradition of abandoning the sick. The
government complained of not having money to pay state employees or to service
its internal debts, and the international community has refused to come to its
rescue, citing among other reasons gross mismanagement, excessive corruption
in high places, and persistent human rights abuses. See Democracy in West
Africa: Moins ,a change .... ECONOMISr, January 22, 1994, at 45-46. In the
thirty years since independence, an estimated 1,610 billion CFA francs (CFAF),
roughly $5.31 billion, have been embezzled by public officials and safely stashed
away in European banks. See P. J. TEDGA, ENTERPRISES PUBLIQUES, ETAT Er CRISE
AU CAMFoUN: FAILLITE D'uN SYSTEME 246-56 (1990). Of this amount, 650 billion
CFAF, or $2.145 billion, left the state during a four year period, 1986-1990. Id.
Putting these figures in some perspective, private Cameroonian wealth abroad
essentially is enough to wipe out the state's external debt. The public outrage
stirred by these revelations of this systematic looting has been understandably
harsh. Much of this huge fortune was diverted into the pockets of the ruling elite,
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the better part of his examination of a patient with a high fever to
doing a cost-benefit analysis of the disease? Surely, one would
expect the physician to attempt to lower the patient's body
temperature and to do everything medically possible to discover
the underlying infection responsible for causing the fever with a
view toward eliminating it.23 The conventional wisdom of treating
the problem of spoliation as an exercise in "balance sheet balancing" leaves Third World scholars uncomfortable.
Moreover, the apparent reluctance by publicists to confront
the problem of indigenous spoliation and to elevate it to the level
of international concern raises some very troubling questions
about the priorities and objectives of Western scholarship. For
instance, a recently published collection of articles and debates
on the enduring as well as the controversial issues of international law24 fails to include a single essay on the problem of
indigenous spoliation. 2 5
Apparently, the persistent and
systematic assaults on the economic rights of Third World peoples
by their leaders do not rank high enough on the scale of
normativity2 6 as a subject that can test the foundations of
international law. Could the failure to provide space for just one
essay on indigenous spoliation be explained on the ground that,
because Euro-American interests are not directly or are only
remotely affected by these obscene acts of depredations, little is
served in deploying intellectual resources to resolve someone

with the Biya family allegedly heading the pack of plunderers. See, e.g. Gerard
Mpessa Moulongo, Chroniqud d' un pillage annonce, JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE, no.
151, janvier 1992, 175-83 (presents a who's who of prominent Cameroonians,
public servants as well as private businessmen, who have mulcted the national
treasury).
23. Werlin, discussing corruption in Ghana, employs the metaphor but in
a slightly different form. See Roots of Corruption,supra note 20, at 250.
24.
See INTERNATIONAL LAW ANThOLOGY 1 (Anthony D nAmato
ed., 1994).
25.
Id. at xv. The editor of the anthology, Professor Anthony D'Amato,
proudly describes the essays as "writings that grapple with the deep issues and
fascinating underpinnings of international law, writings that test the foundations
of the discipline in light of today's and tomorrow's problems and issues." Id.
Professor D'Amato predicts that the volume will "last for years and years." Id.
26.
A trend has been observed in the development of international law
"towards the replacement of the monolithically conceived normativity of the past
by graduated normativity." The result is the emergence of a new scale of
normativity in which norms are not merely distinguished from non-norms, as was
the case in the past, but among the norms themselves. The "super-norms' are
carefully segregated from the "ordinary" ones. See Prosper Wel, Towards Relative
Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 421 (1983). Clearly, a
new normativity is at work that allows one group of international law scholars to
decide for the rest which issues test the very foundations of international law.
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else's problem? If so, could this omission be a subtle reminder
that international law is still the preserve of the developed states
of Europe and North America whose "vital interests" it continues
to reflect?
Might an international legal community in which Third World
scholars set the intellectual and publishing agenda have produced

an international law anthology on the enduring problems of our
world without as much as including a single essay on indigenous
spoliation? And, might a global community of states dominated
by Third World members have approached the problem of indigenous spoliation differently? If so, what questions would they have
asked; which issues would have been stressed; and what
solutions would they have proposed? In a nutshell, this Article
addresses the challenges raised by these questions. It is time
once again to draw international attention to the persistent
problem of economic plunder in general and high-level official
graft in particular-the problem of indigenous spoliation. Perhaps
if more is written about indigenous spoliation, the world
community of scholars and policymakers may finally take note
and address the problem.
Accordingly, this Article advances and attempts to confinm
the thesis that acts of indigenous spoliation by high-ranking
government officials violate the law of states and that
responsibility for these acts attaches to the individuals
committing them. These acts violate (1) treaty-based obligations
imposing duties upon parties to promote individual economic
rights within their domestic spheres; (2) treaty-based obligations
imposing duties on parties to promote and protect fundamental
human rights and freedoms; and (3) customary international law.
Part II of this Article offers a definition of indigenous spoliation and presents several concrete descriptions of important instances of this practice, as well as its macroeconomic consequences on both the national and international spheres. This
analysis refutes the view advanced by some U.S. scholars that
these acts of economic piracy possess some socially beneficial
value. Part III briefly describes the current state of municipal law
on, and its inadequacy as a vehicle for, the recovery and
repatriation of spoliated funds and the pressing need for
international law to provide a remedy. Part IV confirms the thesis
that indigenous spoliation violates the law of states by showing
how a fundamental, internationally protected human right-the
right of a people to exercise permanent sovereignty over their
wealth and natural resources-is implicated. Part V proposes a
framework for holding persons involved in acts of spoliation
individually liable. Finally, Part VI builds on the discussion of
extraterritorial effects of indigenous spoliation and advances
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several options that the world community can pursue to bring it

under international discipline.

II.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A. A Definition of lndigenous Spoliation
Indigenous spoliation is an illegal act of depredation
committed for private ends by constitutionally responsible rulers,
Such terms as
public officials, or private individuals.2 7
"embezzlement," "misappropriation," "corruption," and "graft"
have been, and continue to be, used to describe the widespread
practice of office-holders confusing the public treasury with their
private accounts. 28 However, these concepts do not adequately
The focus of
27.
The definition of corruption is much narrower.
indigenous spoliation is on the illegitimate use of power for private ends by a
heads of states and
particular group of people who hold public trust:
governments and other high-ranking constitutionally elected and appointed
leaders. The circle of persons liable for acts of indigenous spoliation parallels the
list of possible offenders in the Genocide Convention. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. There was much discussion during the
drafting of the Genocide Convention on the circle of persons liable for persecution
under the Convention. In the end, the final version of the Convention put to rest
many of these concerns. Article IV stipulates that persons committing acts
punishable under the Convention shall be punishable regardless of whether they
are "public officials or private individuals." Id. Some concern was raised whether
this definition was not only limiting but imprecise as well in that there are
persons who act on behalf of the state, such as Members of Parliament, who do
not qualify as officials sfrictu sensu. The comment to Article IV of the draft
Convention prepared by the UN Secretary-General ("[T]hose committing genocide
shall be punished, be they rulers, public officials or private individuals") sought to

clarify this point: "[tihe perpetration of genocide can indeed be the act of
The heaviest responsibility is that of
statesmen, officials or individuals.
statesmen or rulers in the broad sense of the word...." Draft Convention on the
Crime of Genocide, 4 U.N. Stat. ESCOR, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947)
[hereinafter Draft Convention on Genocide].
In the final version of Article IV that was adopted by the UN General
Assembly, the words "constitutionally responsible" were added to qualify "rulers."
The inclusion of "constitutionally responsible rulers" among the circle of persons
liable for persecution under the Convention explicitly excludes the plea of acts of
ITS ORIGINS AND
state. See ROBINSON NEHEMIAH, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION:
INTERPRETAION 22 (1949).
28.
Kleptocracy has been offered as a substitute. See, e.g., STANISLAV L.
ANDRESIG, THE AFRICAN PREDICAMENTI* A STUDY IN THE PATHOLOGY OF MODERNISATION
93-109 (1968). "The essence of kleptocracy is that the functioning of the organs
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convey the full force of the relatively new phenomenon of
Over the last two decades, several
indigenous spoliation.2 9
dictators have executed coordinated plans with the effect, if not
the objective, of destroying the essential foundations of the
economic life of a society. Their activity warrants a new name,
because-as Raphael Lemkin 3 0 argued some four decades ago

of authority is determined by the mechanisms of supply and demand rather than
the laws and regulation. Id. at 109. The ordinary meaning associated with the
term "kleptocracy" is a ruling body or order of thieves." 8 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICnONARY 477 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989). Again, like the
other terms, kleptocracy only succeeds in describing the act of thieving but fails
Other scholars have referred to these
to convey its effects on the society. Id.
countries as "vampire states." See generally JONATHAN H. FRIMPONG-ANSAH, THE
VAMPIRE STATE INAFRICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECLINE IN GHANA (1992).
Consider, for example, some of the startling disclosures that were
29.
made in three Commissions of Inquiry set up by the military government that
overthrew a civilian government in Sierra Leone in 1991-the Beccles-Davies
Commission of Inquiry. One of the first witnesses to appear before the BecclesDavies Commission was the former Inspector-General of Police, Mr. James
Bambay Kamara, who disclosed that he had substantial money in several local
and overseas bank accounts, he owned over 30 pieces of property in the state,
and occasionally kept between Le 10,000 and Le 20,000 in his office which he
used to help people. At the time of the coup, Mr. Kamara's monthly salary
including allowances was Le 18,042.
Another example of phantom contracts that was brought to the attention of
the Lynton Nylander Commission of Inquiry was the award of a $20 million
contract to Siemens for the rehabilitation of the Sierra Leone Broadcasting
Service. The contract was never performed though the contractors were paid Le
66 million on the instructions of the former Minister of Information and
Broadcasting. Fake contracts, kickbacks, assets out of step with salaries, and
outright conversion of public funds were the order of the day in Sierra Leone.
Take the case of Mr. Michael Abdulai, the former Minister of Transport and
Communication, who also appeared before the Beccles-Davies Commission. His
cabinet portfolio gave him jurisdiction over the state's sea and inland waters
ports. In 1987, Abdulai executed a Memorandum of Understanding and Consultancy Agreement with the managers of the Sierra Leone Ports Authority (SLPA),
which provided that Abdulai would be secretly paid a lump sum of $100,000 each
year plus a 10% commission on all purchases made overseas by the SLPA.
A former diplomat and government minister, Aiah M'bayo, told the BecclesDavies Commission that the Algerian government had donated four million
dollars, five hundred tons of fuel, and a shipload of provisions as Algeria's own
contribution to the hosting of the OAU summit in Sierra Leone. However,
contrary to the intentions of the Algerian government, the money was distributed
among some of Sierra Leone's ambassadors. This kind of graft contributed in no

small measure to the classification of Sierra Leone as the poorest of the poor.
This is not ordinary, run-of-the-mill corruption. This type of activity is graft of a
different order: the kind that can literally bankrupt a state's economy, arrest its
development, and condemn its people to a life of poverty and misery.
Professor Raphael Lemdn was one of three experts-the other two
30.
were Professor Henri Donnedieu de Vabres of the University of Paris and
Professor Vespasian V. Pella, President of the International Association of Penal
Law-who assisted Professor John P. Humphrey, Director of the Division of
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when he introduced the word "genocide" into the lexicon of
political discourse-a new crime deserves a new name.3 1 The
word "patrimonicide" seems appropriate for this new international
economic crime. The word comes from combining the Latin words
"patrimonium," meaning "[tihe estate or property belonging by
ancient right to an institution, corporation, or class; especially the
ancient estate or endowment of a church or religious body,"3 2 and
"cide," meaning killing. This term is fitting because indigenous
spoliation is the destruction of the sum total of a state's endowment, the laying waste of the wealth and resources belonging by
right to her citizens, and the denial of their heritage.
Although political leaders have historically misappropriated
the wealth of their peoples, three things distinguish this new
generation of "economic crimes of former dictators."3 3 The first
feature is that, unlike past depredations where the wealth
remained in the territory for recycling, the modern context is
characterized by "great mobility of wealth and the capacity to hide
and disguise it."3 A Filipino senior executive of a multinational
oil company operating in the Philippines accurately summarized
the situation: "If only these people kept their money here and
Human Rights at the United Nations, in preparing a Draft Convention on
Genocide. See Draft Convention on Genocide, supra note 27, at 15.
31.
Raphael Lemkin, Genocide-A Modern Crime, 9 FREE WORLD, APRIL
1945, at 39. The depredations discussed in this Article pale in comparison to the

horrors for which Lemkin's term "genocide" has been reserved.

Nonetheless,

recognition that spoliation by indigenous rulers is offensive is a step forward in
the evolution of international law, as it pertains to respect for the rights and
obligations of individuals. Spoliation is an activity with immediate effects, such
as capital flight, that have immediate macro- and micro-economic consequences,
especially when the amounts involved are substantial. The victims are easily
identifiable: unemployed and underemployed college and university graduates
that the economy simply cannot absorb; ordinary citizens who cannot count on
services from any of the social agencies and who suffer hardships such as
undernourishment and high infant mortality rates.
32.
See 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 349 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner
eds., 2d ed., 1989); see also OXFORD LATIN DICIONARY 1310 (P.G.W. Glare ed.,
1983) (defining patrimonium as the property of a paterfamilias,private or personal
possessions, estate, fortune.).
33.
See ASIL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 395 (remarks by Professor
Chayes). Presidential corruption is an old problem. HUGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE
PURSUIT OF FREEDOM (documenting presidential corruption in Cuba dating back to
the turn of the century during the administration of President Gomez and ending
with Fulgencio Batista's second tenure as President of Cuba). Edwin Lieuwen
also documents gross presidential graft in Venezuela covering a span of five decades. See EDWIN LIEUWEN, VENEzuELA (1961).
34.
See ASIL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 395; see also Hetzer, supra
note 12, at 189; Kraar, supra note 12, at 97.
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reinvested it in productive enterprises, our problems would be a

lot more manageable."35

This statement undermines

the

argument that patrimonicide has a socially beneficial side.
A second feature of the modem version of indigenous spoliation is the amount of wealth involved-usually billions of dollars.
So stupendous are the amounts of wealth involved that one
commentator described these depredations as going "beyond
shame and almost beyond imagination." 36 Indeed, the private
buildup of assets abroad is usually so large in relation to the total
external debts of the states from which these funds were spoliated
that in some cases it even exceeds these states' total foreign
37
debt.
A third new aspect of contemporary indigenous spoliation is
the social and economic devastation that follows when capital of
the magnitude described above is allowed to leave any state,
particularly a capital-poor developing state. The ultimate losers
and victims are the ordinary citizens. 38 The economies suffer
because the accumulation of these substantial assets abroad has
the effect of draining resources, both domestic and external, that
might otherwise have been used for domestic investment.3 9 As
resources are funneled into private accounts abroad, governments, state enterprises, central banks, and private-sector
companies are forced to borrow from foreign lenders.! 0 These

35.
Pete Carey et al., Marcos Top Associates Stash Personal Fortunes
Overseas, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, in 131 CONG. REC. S. 15, 124 (Nov. 4, 1985).
DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD CREDIT
36.
CRISIs 60 (1984); see also C. BRAECKMAN, LE DINOSAURE (1990).
See Rimmer de Vries, LDC debt: debt relief or market solutions?, 1986
37.
WORLD FIN. MARKETS 1, 6.
Commenting on the real estate buying spree of the Marcoses in the
38.
United States, Congressman Stephen Solarz noted that such actions cheat the
Philippines in two ways: First, "[tihe corrupt practices [President Marcos] has
engaged in and encouraged have made him one of the world's richest men while
impoverishing millions of people in his own country and greatly accentuating the
prospects for progress on the part of the Communist-dominated New People's
Army. Second, the hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars he has acquired
represent resources that would otherwise be available to meet the basic needs of
the Filipino people...." Investigation of the PhilippineInvestments in the United
States,HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Committee on ForeignAffairs, 99th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., 263 (1985 & 1986)
(statement of Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the Subcommittee) (hereinafter

PhilippineHearings).
39.
Id.
40.
Id. According to the Economist, Africa's debt in 1993 had more than
tripled since 1980 as a result of new borrowings. More importantly, because of
the build-up of unpaid interest, Africa has been able to meet only half of its
debt-servicing obligations. See African debt: Borrowed time, ECONOMIST, May 22,
1993, at 52 (hereinafter African debt).
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external borrowings create new liabilities, which must be paid off
by governments whose economies are already overburdened with
debt.4 1 The price of these outflows of foreign exchange to the
industrial world is "billions of dollars-worth of unsurfaced roads,
42
unpurified water and untreated illnesses."
The focus of this Article is not on ordinary corruption, but
rather on the illegitimate use of power for private ends by a
particular group of people who hold public trust: heads of states
and governments and other high-ranking, constitutionally elected
and appointed leaders. Focusing on this group is justified for
several reasons. First, large-scale expropriation of a state's
resources typically requires the consent of the president or head
of state. In Latin America, the chief executive presides over the
plunder of the state's resources: limited corruption can always
escape presidential scrutiny, "but on a large-scale systematic
basis it normally must require at least his tacit acquiescence and,
more likely, his personal supervision." 43 This view is consistent
with what other observers have remarked with regard to the
presidential regimes in Africa. 44 Second, current efforts to curb
corruption are aimed primarily at low-level government officials.
Graft at the presidential level is merely mirrored, on a smaller
scale, by officials at all levels of government. Thus, chief
executives are the appropriate target for corruption inquiries.
However, given the intimate involvement of high-level
executives in the organized plunder of national resources, it is not
surprising that such inquiries, as well as laws prohibiting corruption, almost always target low-level officials, rarely looking into

"the politically dangerous areas of the Presidency, the party, and

41.
In order to maintain payments on their debts, many Third World
governments use up scarce foreign exchange. "Uganda spends two-thirds of all
the foreign currency it earns from exports servicing its debts." It has been
estimated that "[t]he average share spent servicing debt in sub-Saharan Africa is
about one-fifth." See African debt, supranote 40, at 82.
42.
Id.
43.
See Whitehead, supranote 13, at 148.
44.
These observers include the Apaloo Commission of Inquiry, several
other commissions appointed to investigate high-level corruption in Ghana during
Kwame Nkrumah's administration, and Stephen Riley who studied corruption in
Sierra Leone. See VICTOR T. LE VINE, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: THE GHANA CASE 29
(1975); see also SAMUEL IKOKU, LE GHANA DE KWAME NKRUMAH 111 (1971). See
Stephen Riley, 'The land of waving palms': political economy, corruption inquiries
and politics in Sierra Leone, in CORRUPnON: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROL
190, 202 (Michael Clarke ed., 1983).
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the activities of the country's ministerial oligarchs."'
low-level officials is useful only:

Targeting

as evidence in areas of low-level, incidental and systematic corruption; they are not, however, and indeed cannot for political reasons
be used as evidence in cases of high-level systemic corruption. It
is unlikely that a corrupt regime will investigate itself; it is only
possible when there is a change of regime, and then the exercise is
politically suspect (as an apologia for the current regime). 46
Finally, in light of the prevailing Western academic view that
corruption is socially beneficial, a reminder of how the vast
amounts of state funds routinely stolen by heads of state contin-

ue to exact a heavy financial toll on state economies might result
in a reassessment of this thesis. Of five Latin American presidents ousted between 1952 and 1961, their reported fortunes,
obtained mostly through graft, have been estimated at $1.8 to
$2.6 billion 4 7 against a total foreign debt of about $2 billion for
the five states. 4 8 A similar picture emerges in Africa. In the early
1960s, for example, Maurice Yameogo, first president of Upper
Volta (now Burkina Faso) was prosecuted for embezzling
49
£1,212,000 during his tenure in office.

45.
LEVINE, supranote 44, at 23.
46.
See Riley, supranote 44, at 195. Le Vine offers an identical
explanation for Ghana. See LEVINE, supranote 44, at 80. The Ghanaian

novelist, Ayi Kwei Armah, is even more forthright in his dismissal of post-coup
corruption inquiries in his country as no better than "a net to catch only the
small, dispensable fellows, trying in their anguished blindness to leap and to
attain the gleam and the comfort the only way these things can be done. And the
big ones floated free, like all the slogans." See AYI KWEI ARMAH, THE BEAUYUL
ONES ARE NOTYET BORN 180 (1989); see also Roots of Corruption,supra note 20, at
248. When corruption became so widespread and common in the Philippines,
President Ferdinand Marcos appointed a commission in 1984 to investigate
persistent allegations that high-ranking officials close to the First Family were
exporting huge amounts of illegally obtained state funds to safe havens abroad.
Few Filipinos had any confidence in the commission: "[it] was appointed by the
president, and it will concentrate only on small operators. To expect otherwise
would be silly self-deception," said a consultant to a leading Philippine bank. See
131 CONG. REC. 15,124, supra note 35.
47.
These fortunes include: Miguel Aleman of Mexico, $500-$800 million;

Juan Peron of Argentina, $500-$700 million; Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela,
over $250 million; Cuba's Fulgencio Batista, $100-$300 million; and Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, $500 million. See Whitehead, supranote 13,
at 146, 150.
48.
Id.
49.
See RUTH FIRST, POWERIN AFRICA 103 (1970).
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B. The InternationalDimension of Indigenous Spoliation
Although the conduct of indigenous

spoliation

and its

immediate victims appear to be confined to developing states, the
problem does have worldwide significance. 50 The founders of the
United Nations clearly saw a direct link between economic
well-being and international peace. The UN Charter states, in its
Preamble and Article 1, that the United Nations was established,
interalia, to promote better qualify of life, the economic and social
advancement of all peoples, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.5 1 The right of a people to the benefits from, and the
sovereignty over, their resources is a fundamental human right. 52
This right is denied when a state's wealth is diverted for the
personal use of its political leaders. By the express terms of
Article 55 of the Charter, members of the United Nations have a
duty to discourage this form of economic exploitation of a state's
53
wealth.
1. Stress and Strain on Interstate Relations
Economic crimes by a ruling oligarchy have not only a local
character but also extraterritorial effects. They affect relations
between states, unleashing a range of reactions that threaten
international peace. Demonstrations by an outraged public, often
violent, have usually occurred in states willing to provide
sanctuary for fleeing dictators who have looted the economies of

50.
In the congressional hearings on Philippine investments in the United
States, several members of the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Asian
and Pacific Affairs were insightful enough to see clearly the transnational implications of what at first blush could be mistaken for a purely intra-national problem.

In particular, the chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Solarz, repeatedly

drew his colleagues' attention to the profound and serious questions for U.S.
foreign policy that the Marcoses' vast investments in the United States raised.
See Philippine Hearings, supra note 38, at 252. This view was echoed by
Congressman Leach who also argued that there were significant policy
implications for the United States 'when it becomes apparent that a country to
which we give aid is run by a family which allocates the resources of the land to
its own personal use and which, in effect, loots the capacity of that country to
achieve responsible economic growth and advance the welfare of its people." See
id at 264.
51.
See U.N. CHARTER pmbl., art. 1.

52.

See discussion infra pt. IV.

53.

U.N. CHARTER art 55.
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their home states. The refusal of asylum states to surrender
fugitives to the requesting states to stand trial for their crimes
frequently invites diplomatic protests from the requesting state or
an outright rupture in diplomatic relations. England's refusal to
extradite Umaru Dikko-a former Nigerian politician under the
civilian administration of President Shehu Shagari, which was
overthrown by a military coup in 1983-severely strained
Anglo-Nigerian relations for several years.54 In short, economic
crimes of the sort typified by indigenous spoliation are not only
directed against the domestic public order, but also violate the
international public order. Perpetrators of such acts, therefore,
constitute a danger to the public order of other states, and it is in
the mutual interest of states to apprehend and to punish them.
2. Failed Efforts to Contain Cross-Border Refugee Flows
As already pointed out, capital flight almost always leads to
grave economic problems for developing states, the resolution of
which hinges on the assistance and generosity of the international community.5 5 Economies in distress traditionally look to the
rich, industrialized states and international financial institutions
for financial aid. However, the rich, industrialized states do more
than provide economic assistance to strengthen collapsing
economies. They also must contend with the influx of economic

54.

Dikko was among a number of civilian politicians who fled Nigeria to

England shortly after a military coup on December 31, 1983. Others who fled
included: Chief Adisa Akinloye, Mallam Ali Makele, Emmanuel Osamor, the
former Finance Minister, Dr. Sunday Essang, and Dikko, brother-in-law of the
former President and his Minister of Transport. Chief Adisa Akinloye and Mallam
Ali Makele were alleged to have conspired with others to receive kickbacks of 29.1
million naira (then worth $18.2 million). In addition, Chief Akinloye is alleged to
have received 1.5 million nairain cash for himself and an additional 375,000
nairapaid in dollars on his demand to a Swiss bank account. The Nigerian

government alleged that Dikko had corruptly amassed a $3.5 billion fortune
during his four years in office as Minister of Transport. See Nigeria's Fresh Start,
TIMES (London), May 9, 1989, at 17; Richard Dowden, Nigerian kidnap man seeks
asylum, TIMES (London), Dec. 21, 1984, at 28.
55.
Periodically, debts have been forgiven or rescheduled. A succession of
rescheduling arrangements has been attempted in the last several years. The
"Trinidad terms," the first of many, proposed in 1990 by then Chancellor of the
Exchequer, John Majors, has as its goal writing off two-thirds of a poor state's
debt incurred before a certain date, and rescheduling the rest over twenty-five
years. Alternatively, the so-called "enhanced Toronto terms7 proposes to cancel
only half a poor state's debts contracted before a certain debt and then to
reschedule the remaining half over a protracted term. These efforts have all been
a drop in the bucket, barely denting the servicing problem. See African debt
supranote 40, at 52-53.
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refugees forced to flee their home states for the more salubrious
economic shores of Western Europe and the United States.
Governments in these industrialized states have reacted to

the threat of asylum-seekers flooding their shores in several ways.
Some governments have been forced to take a closer look at the
activities of their prot6g6s around the world in order to ascertain
what additional support can be provided. For instance, the increasing number of refugees who fled Haiti for United States
shores5 6 in the late 1970s played a major role in the decision
made by the United States and several international development
agencies to intervene more forcefully in Haiti's internal affairs in
1980. By mid-1981 the number of Haitian immigrants had risen
to 45,000,5 7 roughly half of whom had applied for political asylum
in the United States.5 8 Interestingly, the U.S. government has
59
taken to referring to these boat people as "economic migrants"

56.
JOSH DEWIND & DAVID H. KINLEY III, AIDING MIGRATION: THE IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON HAITI xiv (1988). A 1980 estimate puts
the number of Haitians living outside their homeland at 680,000-roughly 12% of
the population of Haiti.
See James Allman, Haitian Immigration: 30 Years
Assessed, 10 MIGRATION TODAY 7,11 (1982) cited with approval in DEWIND &
KINLEY, supraat 6-7.
57.
See DEWIND & KINLEY, supranote 56, at 1.
58.
Statistics on immigration compiled annually by the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service show that the overwhelming majority of
Haitian immigrants to the United States between 1962 and 1978 came from the
rural poor. See SUSAN BUCHANAN, HAITIAN EMIGRATION: THE PERSPECTIE FROM
SOUTH FLORIDA AND HAM 203 (1981). This statistic tends to support the United
States government's position that the root cause of migration is economic, and
not political.
59.
This description has been endorsed by successive United States

presidents from Richard M. Nixon to George H.W. Bush. See DEWIND & KINLEY,
supranote 56, at 1-2. See also FAGEN, Applying for PoliticalAsylum in New York:
Law, Policy and Administrative Practice,in N.Y.U. CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND
CARIBBEAN STUDIES, at 23 (1984); G.D. LOESCHER & J. SCANLON, U.S. ForeignPolicy
and Its Impact on the U.S. Refugee Flow From Hait4 N.Y.U. CENTER FOR LATIN
AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES, 24-25 (1984). To be sure, supporters of the
Haitian boat people have countered on two levels. First, they have argued that
the vast majority of the immigrants are fleeing political persecution and are
therefore entitled to asylum under United States law and international law. See
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.Supp. 442, 462 (S.D. Fla. 1980); see
also Thomas Powers, The Scandal of U.S. Immigration: The HaitianExample, MS.
MAGAZINE, Feb. 1976, at 62-66, 81-83. Second, they argue that the separation of
political and economic causes of Haitian migration is artificial and misleading.
See DEWIND & KINLEY, supranote 56, at 5. It is unrealistic to talk of one without
the other because they are so intertwined. See ALEX DUPUY, HAITI IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY: CLASS, RACE, AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT SINCE 1700, 185 (1988); A.
STEPICK, Haitians Released From Krome: Their Prospects for Adaptation and
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who are fleeing poverty rather than persecution. 6° Consistent
with the view that Haitian emigration is economically rather than
politically motivated, the United States and other Western
governments responded by expanding and increasing their
economic assistance programs. Between 1973 and 1981, these
governments provided close to $500 million of development
assistance to the Haitian economy.
But this massive international effort to transfer huge sums of
money to Haiti still failed to staunch the flow of emigration.
6
may unwittingly
Judge King in HaitianRefugee Center v. Civiletthi
have provided an explanation for this state of affairs. "The
Haitians' economic situation," the judge stated, "is a political
condition," and "much of Haiti's poverty is the result of Duvalier's
efforts to maintain power." 62 DeWind and Kinley argue:
From an analysis of the structure, policies, and socio-economic
impacts of past aid programs, it appears that internationally
sponsored development initiatives were in large part subverted by
the Haitian government through a combination of bureaucratic
mismanagement and corruption, which s tematically diverted aid
needy.
resources away from the genuinely

In a similar vein, a Canadian assessment of foreign aid programs

in Haiti concluded that:
[L]ittle progress has been made in reducing the notorious misuse of
public revenues for private purposes. Huge sums are still diverted
in countless different ways. . . . The man on the top of the
hierarchy is hardly about to put a stop to this integral part of
Haitian life for he is undoubtedly its greatest beneficiary.6

The international dimensions of this problem are clear. Such
fiscal diversions inevitably create large-scale poverty, which in
turn forces the economically deprived to seek a better life outside
Haiti and similarly situated states. The threat of a flood of

Integration in South Florida,FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY LATIN AMERICAN AND
CARIBBEAN STUDIES CEMTIER 347 (1984).
For international legal definitions of "refugee," see Convention Relating
60.
to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. 150, as
modified by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
See also Declaration on
1967, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2313, 22 U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
81; U.N. Doc. A/6912 (1967); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.

102 (1980).
503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
61.
Civilett, 503 F. Supp. at 509; see also WORLD BANK, COUNTRY PROGRAM
62.
PAPER, HAITI 21-22 (1983); P.E. ENGLISH, CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 10
HAITI 24-26 (1984).
See DEWIND & KINLEY, supra note 56, at 39-40, 44.
63.
See ENGLISH, supra note 62, at 28-30.
64.
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unwanted, unskilled, and illiterate refugees trying to enter
Western industrialized states has caused these states to scramble
to develop additional aid packages to induce these prospective
refugees not to leave their home states.
3. The Consequences of Cross-Border Refugee Flows:
Compassion Fatigue and Violent Backlash Against Foreigners
Foreign aid directed at halting the flow of "economic refugees"
rarely reaches its intended beneficiaries. As a result, "economic

refugees" from Haiti and other states have continued to flood the
shores of the United States and Western Europe.6 5 Their
presence has in turn provoked a backlash from the governments
Increasingly, the
and citizenry of the receiving states. 66
governments of Europe are losing their tolerance and have begun
erecting legal 67 and psychological walls to keep out economic
migrants.6 8 Refugees compete with citizens of their host states
for scarce resources-land, water, housing, food, and medical
services. 6 9 "As a result, the economics and services of the coun-

65.
The explosion of so-called "poverty refugees" fleeing the destitution of
their home states far exceeds the number of "traditional refugees" fleeing
persecution and armed conflict. See T. Stoltenberg, UNHCR Refugees a problem
for all, HINDUSTANI TIMES, Oct. 29, 1990 cited in Shamsul Bari, The Right to
Development and Refugee Protection, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN
INTERNAONAL LAW 181 (S. R. Chowdury, et al. ed., 1992). The United States is
currently confronting what experts now call the "fourth wave" of immigration.
Between 1970 and 1993, 25 million immigrants and refugees have entered the
United States; this figure represents an annual rate of acceptance far in excess of
that of the rest of the world combined. See Immigration: We must manage this flood
of newcomers better, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 3, 1993, at 2J (hereinafter
Immigration).
66.
A nationwide survey of opinions toward immigration revealed that 65%
of Americans have reached their threshold of tolerance and now want limits on
the massive influx of refugees into the United States. See Immigration, supranote
64, at 2J; see also Bruce W. Nelan, Europe Slams the Door, TIME, July 19, 1993, at
38-40; David A. Martin, Interdiction,Intervention, and the New Frontiers of Refugee
Law and Policy,33 VA. J. INT'L L. 473 (1993).
67.
Most recently, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany
has been changed to stop the flow of refugees. See generally Michael W. Devine,
Note, GermanAsylum Law Reform and the European Community: Crisis in Europe,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 795 (1993).
68.
See Shamsul Bari, The Right to Development and Refugee Protection, in
THE RIGHT To DEVELOPMENT ININIERNA[ONA LAW 167, 173 (S.R. Chowdhury et al.,
eds., 1992) (hereinafter Refugee Protection); see also Nelan, supranote 66.

69.

Opposition to the United States so-called open-door policy to

immigrants has focused on the high costs of maintaining such a system. Indeed,
the annual cost of illegal immigration to taxpayers in California-one of the six
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tries of asylum are often under severe pressure, and their own
people are seriously deprived."70 This sense of deprivation is at
the root of so-called "compassion fatigue," a growing feeling
among Western Europeans that their generosity in providing a
safe harbor for "poverty refugees" has reached its breaking
point.7 1 The negative public perception of refugees that such
feelings engender may explain partly the rise in racism in France
and neo-Nazism in Germany, 72 as well as the treatment of Haitian
refugees in the United States.
The negative perception of immigrants, particularly illegal
immigrants, is also reinforced by the popular view of them as
economic parasites and inveterate lawbreakers. In a 1993 editorial, the DallasMorning News drew attention to the economic costs
of illegal immigration to the United States. 73 The editorial cited
one estimate that placed the nationwide cost of illegal immigrants
in 1990 at approximately $5.5 bilion.7 4
There is growing evidence that as the number of immigrants
increases in the United States, a sizeable proportion of these
newcomers are attracted to criminal, rather than entrepreneurial,
activities. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York City
on February 26, 1993, which resulted in six deaths, over 1,000
injuries, and $1 billion in damage, was allegedly the work of
immigrants. 75 Other studies have demonstrated a link between
immigration and crime. 7 6 Overall, immigrants overpopulate both
state and federal correctional systems at staggering costs to
77
taxpayers.
Cross-border refugee flows pose a real threat to regional, if
not global, stability. Therefore, the community of states has an

states where the bulk of immigrants settle-has been estimated at $2.3 billion.
See Immigration, supra note 65, at 2J; see also Immigration: Swell of newcomers

distortsthe workplace, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4, 1993, at 14A.
70.
J.N. Saxena, Uprooted People and Development, in THE RIGHT To
DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179, 182 (S.R. Chowdury, et. al., eds., 1992)

(citing Refugees in the Developing WorlcL A Challenge to the International
Community, U.N. GAOR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme, 34th Sess., Annex III, at 6-7); U.N. Doc. A/AC 96/627 (1983).
71.
Saxena, supra note 70, at 182.
72.
See, e.g., Report on the Committee of Inquiry on Racism and
Xenophobia, A3-195/90, rec. 31 1990 O.J. [hereinafter Report of Committee on
Racism and Xenophobia].
73.
Immigration:Newcomers are burdening U.S. taxpayers, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 17, 1993, at 2J.
74.
Id.
75.
Immigration: Congress must confront criminal impact, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 10, 1993, at 2J (hereinafter Immigration and Crime).
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
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interest in addressing the root causes of the economic refugee
problem. One way to contain this flood of migration is to ensure
that the wealth of the developing states is put to use for the
populations of these states and not diverted to the private
accounts of ruling oligarchies.

III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW ON INDIGENOUS SPOLIATION

A. The Case Law

1. The Defense of Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to
decline jurisdiction, even when jurisdiction is authorized by a
general venue statute.
Under Piper Aircraft Co. v. Hartzell
Propeller,Inc.78 a suit may be dismissed under this theory after
taking into account: (1) any alternative forum for plaintiffs action;
(2) the private interest factors affecting the interests of the
litigants; and (3) the public interest factors affecting the
convenience of the present forum. Although the first and third
elements of the three-pronged analysis are relatively simple in
their application, the second element-the private interest
concerns-requires a more in-depth analysis. In the case of In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal,79 a federal
district court subsequently subdivided this second factor into two
elements: (1) sources of proof and (2) access to witnesses.
The defense of forum non conveniens has been used successfully to foreclose litigation in a foreign jurisdiction to recover allegedly spoliated funds. In Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi,8 0 Iran
alleged that defendants "accepted bribes and misappropriated,
embezzled or converted 35 billion dollars in Iranian funds ......
The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the dismissal of the suit
based on forum non conveniens, despite the fact that Iran did not
have a suitable alternate forum. 8 ' Thus, under the common law

78.
79.
80.
81.

454 U.S. 235 (1981).
634 F. Supp. 842, 853, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
62 N.Y.2d 474, 477 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
Id. at 478.
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doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may exercise its
discretion in weighing the Piperand Bhopal factors.
2. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine was first articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hemandez,8 2 in which the
Court held that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory."8 3 The act of state
doctrine is a "prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action
in sensitive areas."3 4 A successful assertion of the act of state
doctrine precludes a litigant from bringing action against a foreign
state, regardless of the litigant's jurisdictional arguments.
While the act of state doctrine has remained essentially the
same since Underhill, an exception to the doctrine (the Bernstein
exception) has
been created.
In Bernstein v. N. V.
85
the
Nederlandsche-Amerikannsche Stoomvaart-Maatschappj,
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a case involving the
confiscation of property in Germany by the Nazi government.
After the U.S. State Department informed the court that United
States foreign relations did not demand judicial abstention in
cases involving Nazi confiscations, the court proceeded to
determine the validity of the acts of the German state.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,8 6 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that "[wihile historic notions of sovereign authority do
bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of state doctrine, they
do not dictate its existence" and that the doctrine had
"constitutional underpinnings" requiring the judiciary to refrain
from interfering with the executive branch's conduct of foreign
relations. Sabbatino involved the use of the act of state doctrine
by the Supreme Court to refuse to adjudicate the validity of an
uncompensated confiscation of United States-owned property in

Cuba by the Cuban government.

Because the United States

government had already taken a position on the Cuban taking,

82.

168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).

Id. The case involved a Venezuelan general who was accused of
83.
assaulting a U.S. citizen in Venezuela. The Supreme Court refused to uphold
Underhill's claim that he was unlawfully detained by the Venezuelan government

and dismissed the suit.
84.
See Intl Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981).
85.
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
86.
376 U.S. 398,421 (1964).
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would

risk

embarrassment to the executive branch.
In the more recent decision of Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba,8 7 the Supreme Court again faced the issue of

the act of state doctrine. In Dunhill, former owners of seVeral
expropriated Cuban cigar companies brought an action against
Cuba to recover payments made by Dunhill for cigar shipments
made before and after the property was confiscated by the Cuban
government. The Court held that the proprietary acts of the
government of Cuba did not warrant the application of the act of
state doctrine. As a consequence, an essential element of the
application of the act of state doctrine is the characterization of
the action as a public, as opposed to private or commercial, act of
a sovereign. The burden of establishing an act of state defense
lies with the defendant foreign state.8 8
B. The Act of State Doctrine as a Defense in Spoliation Cases
The act of state doctrine was the centerpiece of the Marcoses'
defense during their legal skirmishes with the Aquino government
that succeeded Ferdinand Marcos. In two noteworthy cases, two
United States Courts of Appeals were asked to consider whether
the doctrine prevented U.S. courts from adjudicating the claims of
the Aquino government because they involved acts of a former
foreign sovereign. The question the Second and Ninth Circuits
had to answer was whether the Marcoses' actions would be
considered acts of the sovereign state or private acts for personal
gain.
In Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,8 9 the Second Circuit
found a number of weaknesses in the defendant's act of state
defense. The U.S. Justice Department, with the concurrence of
the U.S. State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor, argued
that "the burden is on the party asserting the applicability of the
doctrine, and [. . . the] defendants [Marcoses] have to date not

discharged their burden of proving acts of state...." 90 Applying
Dunhill, the court found that the defendants had failed to show
that their acts were public acts protected under the doctrine, but

87.
88.
89.

425 U.S. 682 (1976).
See id. at 694.
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986)

[hereinafter Marcos 1].
90.

Id. at 356-57.
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the court also questioned whether the act of state doctrine was
91
applicable.
When this same defense was raised in another case involving
the Philippine government and Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, the
outcome was different. In Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,9 2 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the act of state defense in
upholding a district court preliminary injunction that barred the
Marcoses from transferring their assets, allegedly purchased with
The court of
money stolen from the Philippine government.
appeals found that the Marcoses' activities were public actions;
therefore, the act of state doctrine precluded judicial review. The
court rejected the view that the Marcoses' activities were private
and asserted that governmental actions fall under the act of state
doctrine even if illegal and regardless of whether the ruling power
The court also concluded that
is lawful and recognized. 9 3
Ferdinand Marcos could invoke the act of state doctrine as a
defense because a United States pronouncement of the legality of
his actions could interfere with foreign relations with the Philip94
pines.
Unlike the Second Circuit action, the Ninth Circuit suit did
not seek the recovery of specific property, but rather of all wealth
allegedly obtained by the Marcoses through theft, fraud,
expropriation, and an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).9 5 Although the district court
granted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to freeze
the property, this decision was quickly overruled by the Ninth
that the act of state doctrine precluded the
Circuit on the ground
96
plaintiffs' claim.
The Ninth Circuit opinion was widely criticized by reviewers,
many of whom maintained that the two cases were virtually
indistinguishable. 9 7 Some commentators have even suggested

91.
92.

Id. at 359.
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987)

(hereinafter Marcos IQ.
Id. at 1483 (citing Banco de
93.

Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438,444 (2d Cir. 1940)).
See 818 F.2d at 1485.
94.
Id. at 1475-77.
95.
Id. at 1490.
96.
See Tacie A. Sundack, Note, Republic of Philippines v. Marcos: The Ninth
97.
CircuitAllows a FormerRuler to Invoke the Act of State DoctrineAgainst a Resisting
Sovereign, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 247 (1988); William J. Ritter, Case Comment,
International Relations-Act of State Doctrine-Marcos' Assets as Act of Philippine

State, 11 SUFFOLK TRANS. NATL L.J. 501 (1988); Douglas J. Chu, Note, Marcos
Mania: The Crusade to Return Marcos' Billions to the Philippines Through the
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that the Ninth Circuit's application of the act of state doctrine was
indicative of its confused view of the issue. 98 This confusion is
apparent in the following statement by the court:
We cannot shut our eyes to the political realities that give rise to
this litigation, nor to the potential effects of its conduct and resolution.

Mr. Marcos and President Aquino represent only two of the competing
political factions engaged in a struggle for control of the Philippines.

While the struggle seems to be resolving itself in favor of President
Aquino, this may not be the end of the matter ... While we are in no
position to judge these things, we cannot rule out the possibility that
the pendulum will swing again, or that some third force will prevail.
What we can say with some certainty is that a pronouncement by our

courts along the lines suggested by plaintiff would have a substantial
effect on what may be a delicate political9 balance,
as would a contrary
9
pronouncement exonerating Mr. Marcos.

The Ninth Circuit appears to have overlooked the fact that
President Aquino had already been recognized by the United

1
States as the head of state and government of the Philippines. 00

The majority chose to overlook the extant relationship between
the Philippines and the United States, speculating instead on
future Philippine political conditions.
These criticisms aside, the Ninth Circuit's opinion is also
contrary to the basic policies underlying the act of state doctrine.
First, the Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded that Marcos' illegal
governmental activities were public and therefore beyond United
States jurisdiction.' 0 ' However, United States courts have long
recognized the distinction between a foreign official's public and
private acts and ruled that the act of state doctrine only protects
official public actions. 1° 2
For example, the Fifth Circuit in
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta held that former Venezuelan President
Jimenez's crimes were acts committed for his private financial
benefit and, therefore, were not sovereign acts shielded by the act
of state doctrine. 10 3 The court implicitly articulated a benefit test
by emphasizing that acts done for "private financial benefit" are
4
not immunized from judicial review by the act of state doctrine.'1

FederalCourts, 18 RUIOERS L.J. 217 (1986). Cf. A.C. Robitaille, Note, The Marcos
Cases: A Considerationof the Act of State Doctrine and the Pursuitof the Assets of
DesposedDictators,9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 85 (1989).
98.
Robitaille, supranote 97.
99.
Marcos if, 818 F.2d at 1486.
100. RobitaiUe, supranote 97, at 99.
101. See Sundack, supra note 97, at 247.
102. Id. at 248 (citing Marcos I, 806 F.2d at 359).
103. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962).
104. Id.; see also Robitaile, supranote 97, at 92.
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Furthermore, a sovereign's illegal activities are not public actions
simply because they are related to governmental activities. Under
the reasoning of Jimenez, Marcos had acted in furtherance of his
own private interests 0 s and, therefore, was not entitled to the
protection of the act of state defense.
Second, even if the Ninth Circuit were correct in holding that
Marcos' crimes were public acts, the act of state doctrine still
would have been inapplicable because Marcos' activities were not
fully executed in the Philippines.1° 6 Marcos, for instance,
attempted to hide the money he spoliated from the Philippines by
purchasing real estate in the United States under an assumed
name, in violation of U.S. law. Clearly, these illegal activities were
reviewable by the Ninth Circuit. By refusing to adjudicate the
legality of Marcos' activities, the court of appeals unwittingly
validated his illegal actions.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's statement that it allowed Marcos

to invoke

the act of state

doctrine in order to

prevent

embarrassment to the United States executive branch and to
alleviate tension between the Philippines and the United States
that may result from adjudication is a non sequitur. First, the
°7
Philippines government brought the action against Marcos.1
Second, the court's insistence on applying the act of state
doctrine to protect Marcos was likely to offend the Philippine
government. The court would not have gone wrong if it ruled that
the adjudication of the validity of Marcos' illegal practices was
permissible.l 0 8
The activities of a sitting or former sovereign that qualify as
public acts are protected under the act of state doctrine, regardless of their legality under the law of the state, and, therefore,
However, if the
beyond the reach of United States courts.
activities are considered private acts for personal gain, the act of
state doctrine is no longer available as a defense. A review of case
law alleging spoliation of state wealth by high-ranking
government officials reveals a very fine line between public and
private activities. To make acts of spoliation adjudicable and
redressable in domestic courts would require treating them as a
If treated as internationally
violation of the law of nations.
prohibited conduct, states will be under a duty to lend assistance
in the recovery of spoliated funds anywhere in the world.

105. Sundack, supranote 97, at 249.
106. Id. at 250 (citing Marcos/f, 818 F.2d at 1476).
107. MarcosHI,818 F.2d at 1485-86.
108. See Judson J. Wambold, Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal
SanctionsFor CorporatePayments Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 238 (1977).
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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY: ITS ORIGINS,
CONTENT, AND RELATION TO INDIGENOUS SPOLIATION

International law comes into being in one of three ways:
through international treaties, international custom (as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law), or general principles of law
recognized by the world's major legal systems. 19
Acts of
indigenous spoliation by high-ranking government officials should
be viewed as a violation of the law of nations. These acts violate
(1) treaty-based obligations that impose on states parties a duty
to promote individual economic rights within their domestic
spheres 1 ° and (2) treaty-based obligations that impose a duty on
states parties to promote and protect fundamental human rights
and freedoms.
In the last half of the twentieth century, international law has
shifted dramatically away from the historical preoccupation with
sovereign-state rights to a concern for the well-being of the

citizens of these states. 1 1 This concern has led to the recognition

and subsequent elaboration of a corpus of rights that pertain to
individuals qua individuals. Among the many rights that have
been recognized are certain fundamental human rights and the

right to minimum economic standards.
Not all of the
112
newly-minted rights have risen to the level of international law.

109. See STA'IUIE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(l), June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 993; see also MARK JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTIONTO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-38 (1988).
110. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
art. 2, para. 1, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (Paul
Williams ed., 1981); African, Caribbean, and Pacific States-European Economic
Community: Final Act, Minutes, and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Dec.
15, 1989, art. 5, reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990).
111. See C. WILFORD JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 17 (1958);
Wolfgang Friedmann, Human Welfare and International Lau-A Reordering of
Priorities,in TRANSNATIONAL LAW INA CHANGING SOCIETY 113 (Wolfgang Friedmann
et. al., eds, 1972).
112. See Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive
Development or Obfuscation of InternationalHuman Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INrL L.
REV. 307 (1982); Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of
the Right to Development, 1 HARV. HUM. RiS. Y.B. 3 (1988); Stephen P. Marks,
Emerging Human Rights: A New Generationfor the 1980s? in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMRARY PERSPECTIVE 501 (Richard Falk et. al. eds., 1985); Louis Sohn, The
New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of IndividualsRather than States, 32
AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982); K. Vasak, For the Third Generation of Human Rights:
The Rights of Solidarity, Inaugural Lecture to the Tenth Study Session of the
International Institute of Human Rights, given in Strasbourg, France, July 2-27,
1979 (manuscript on file with the author).
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Among these fights is the right of peoples to dispose freely of their
national wealth and natural resources. However, this right is
among the inalienable rights of all human beings, as part of the
This section traces the
doctrine of permanent sovereignty.
evolution of this doctrine.
A. PermanentSovereignty and Self-Determination

1. The Draft Covenants on Human Rights
The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources
had its genesis in the Eighth Session of the Human Rights
Commission of the United Nations. 1 13 The concepts of permanent
sovereignty and self-determination were again linked together in
In a 1952
the General Assembly of the United Nations.
resolution, the General Assembly recognized "that the
under-developed countries have the right to determine freely the
use of their natural resources . . . in order to be in a better
position to further the realization of their plans of economic
"114
development in accordance with their national interests ....
In the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the Assembly
recognized "the right of peoples and nations to self-determination
Further, the General Assembly
as a fundamental right."1 15
decided "to include in the International Covenant or Covenants on
Human Rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to
"116 Later that same year, the General
self-determination ....
with the right to exploit
Assembly passed a resolution dealing
1 17
resources.
and
wealth
natural
freely
a. Second Committee Debates: 1952
Also in 1952, the Second Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly discussed the concept of permanent

Somendu Kumar Baneijee, The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty Over
113.
NaturalResources-An Analysis, 8 INDIAN J. INr"L L. 515, 517 (1968). The concept
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was adopted as paragraph three
of Article One of the Covenant. Id. at 517-18.
114. G.A. Res. 523, 6th Sess., 360th plen. mtg. (1952), reprintedin 3 UNIED
NATIONS RESOLUMIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 186 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1972).
G.A. Res. 545, 6th Sess., 375th plen. mtg. (1952) (citing G.A. Res.
115.

421D, 5th'Sess. (1950)), reprinted in 3 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS:
ASSEMBLY 201 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1972).

GENERAL

116. Id.
G.A. Res. 626,7th Sess., 411th plen. mtg. (1952), reprintedin4 UNtiED
117.
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 106 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1972).
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sovereignty.1 1 8 The representative from Uruguay submitted a
draft resolution affirming the principle that "[tlhe ideal for an
under-developed country was to attain economic independence,
[and] to dispose freely of its own resources . . . ."19 The
Uruguayan representative noted that the purpose of the draft
resolution "was to affin-m the need for protecting the population of
under-developed countries and [to justify] their governments'
desire to nationalize their natural resources." 120 The Uruguayan
delegate strongly urged that "if the economic and political
liberation of peoples was sought, measures would have to be
taken to enable them to exploit their natural resources
themselves and for their own benefit."1 2 1 Thus, the Uruguayan
delegate emphasized the link between economic independence,

self-determination,

and permanent

sovereignty over natural

resources. The Haitian representative said that "the adoption of a
draft resolution like the one being considered by the Committee
would weaken the right of sovereign States to nationalize and
exploit their natural wealth." 122 Thus, once again, the notion of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources was linked to
self-determination and economic independence.
The Iranian representative clearly warned that "[c]ertain
industrialized countries would have to realize that in the modem
world a policy of exploiting the resources of another country
against the interests of that country's inhabitants could not be
justified," and that "[a] State's right to nationalize its natural
123
resources was the guarantee of its .economic independence."
However, the capital-exporting states resisted the notion of
permanent sovereignty, while the capital-importing states insisted
that permanent sovereignty over natural resources lay at the
heart of economic independence. 124
b. The Ninth Session of the General Assembly Debates: 1954
The
controversy
between
capital-importing
and
capital-exporting states continued in 1954 during the Ninth

118.

U.N. GAOR 2nd Comm., 231st mtg., at 251-53, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/S.R.

(1952) [hereinafter Second Committee Meeting].
119. Id. at 253.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id at 256.

124.

See infra text accompanying note 125.
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Session of the General Assembly.1 25 During this Session the
General Assembly considered the Draft International Covenant on
Human Rights (Covenant).126 The capital-exporting states raised
objections to the inclusion of the term "permanent sovereignty" in
the discussion of self-determination contained in paragraph three
of Article One of the Covenant. 2 7 The capital-importing states,
on the other hand, insisted that the concept of self-determination
necessarily included the concept that states or peoples should
have control over their own natural resources. 128
This debate in the Ninth Session culminated in a compromise
resolution intended to encourage a stable investment climate and
to recognize some of the demands of the capital-importing states
However, the
with respect to permanent sovereignty.129
resolution did not directly tackle the concept of permanent
Nonetheless, the General
sovereignty over natural resources.
Assembly did tackle the issue of permanent sovereignty over
a
natural resources in the Ninth Session when it adopted
13 0
resolution proposed by the representative from Afghanistan.
c. The Human Rights Commission Debates: 1955
Subsequently, the Human Rights Commission considered the
General Assembly's Resolution in 1955.131 The Human Rights

Commission ultimately adopted a draft resolution recommending
that "in the conduct of the full survey ... due regard would be
paid to the rights and duties of States under international law
and to the importance of encouraging international cooperation in
1 32
the economic development of under-developed countries."

125. Baneijee, supra note 113, at 520.
126. Id
127. Id.
128. Id.
129.
See G.A. Res. 824, 9th Sess., 510th plen. mtg. (1954), reprinted in 5
UNrTED NATIONS RESOLUIONS 128 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973).
130.
Baneijee, supra note 113, at 520. India was one of the delegations to
amend the Afghan representative's proposed resolution. Id. at 520-2 1.
Id. at521.
131.
132.
Id.
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d. The Third Committee Debates: 1955
In 1955, the Third Committee of the General Assembly
conducted in-depth discussions on the concepts of economic
independence, self-determination, and permanent sovereignty.
During the Third Committee's debate, the issues of
self-determination and permanent sovereignty deeply fractured
the Committee.
The Brazilian representative proposed that Article One be
deleted entirely or that the concepts contained therein be moved
to the Preamble. 133 The Yugoslav delegate insisted that "the right
of peoples to self-determination was of fundamental importance,
and.., it should continue to appear in the operative part of the
Covenants." 134 The Greek delegation felt that "right, upon which
all the others were dependent, would not be safeguarded if it were
only made the subject of a declaration of principle in the preamble
to the covenants." 135 The Danish representative favored deletion
36
of the Article altogether.'
A Working Party was established by the Third Committee.
Within the Working Party, the delegates were clearly divided, with
the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands opposing
the inclusion of any article on self-determination and the Asian,
African, and Arab groups favoring such an article.1 3 7 The
Working Party proposed a new Article One. In it, the Working
Party had switched paragraph three with paragraph two, and had
redrafted paragraph three to contain no express reference to
permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources.13 8
Ultimately, the Third Committee adopted the draft text proposed by the Working Party by a vote of thirty-three in favor,
twelve against, and thirteen abstentions.' 3 9 The votes in favor
were largely attributable to the under-developed states and the

133. U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 10th Sess., 638th Mtg. at 70, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR. 638, (1955) (Afghan representative discussing Brazilian proposals)
[hereinafter 638th Meeting].
134. Id. at 69.
135. Id.
136. U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 644th mtg. at 99, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.644
(1955) [hereinafter 644th Meeting].
137. Banerjee, supranote 113, at 522.
138. U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 668th mtg. at 221, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.668
(1955). The Working Party's draft provoked a lengthy debate among the members
of the Third Committee.
139. James N. Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J. INr' L. 854, 857 (1956).
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Communist bloc. 14
The deletion of any express reference to
permanent sovereignty in conjunction with self-determination was
clearly designed as a compromise measure, intended to eliminate
as much opposition as possible. However, the language that the
Third Committee ultimately adopted as paragraph two did
implicitly refer to the concept of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources. During the debate on the Working Party's
Report, many delegations continued to interpret paragraph two as
dealing with the concept.
Thus, despite the fact that the concept of permanent sovereignty was not mentioned expressly in the Third Committee's
Draft Covenant, the concept was implicitly embodied within
paragraph two of Article One.
Clearly, numerous delegates
continued to interpret the language of paragraph two as including
permanent sovereignty over natural resources-the right of
peoples to exploit their own natural wealth.
2. The Economic and Social Council Debate on Implementation:
1955
In 1955, the Economic and Social Council of the United

Nations (ECOSOC) also debated the concept of permanent
sovereignty. 14 1 When the ECOSOC convened it had before it an
important draft resolution, submitted by the Human Rights
Commission, urging the establishment of a commission to survey
the status of the right to permanent sovereignty over natural
wealth and resources.142
The United States representative
introduced an "alternative" proposal, 14 which the Human Rights
Commission had already rejected. 14 4 The ECOSOC ultimately
agreed to transmit both the United States proposal and the draft
resolution of the Human Rights Commission to the General
Assembly. 14" Vocal opposition to the United States proposal

140.

Baneijee, supra note 113, at 522.

141.

Id. at 524.

142.

Id.

143.
I. The ad hoc commission was to contain five members appointed by
the Secretary-General. Id.
144.
Hyde, supra note 139, at 860. The U.S. proposal was opposed by the
Arab-Asian states, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Baneijee,
supra note 109, at 525. The Afro-Asian states argued that such an ad hoc
commission would afford no practical or immediate value. Id In emphasizing the

utmost importance of the concept of permanent sovereignty, these states
continued to maintain that the proposed survey was not intended to oppose
private foreign investment. Id.
145.

Hyde, supra note 139, at 860.
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stressed the importance of the concept of permanent sovereignty
of peoples and states over their natural resources. 14 6
3. The Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources: 1959-61
A three-year moratorium on discussions of permanent
sovereignty ended in 1958 at the Thirteenth Session of the
General Assembly.14 7 Upon the resumption of the debate, the
majority of the Members agreed that the inclusion of the concept
of permanent sovereignty in the Draft Covenants was
necessary. 148
Ultimately, the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 1314 (XIII) on December 12, 1958.149 The Resolution
noted that "the right of peoples and nations to self-determination
as affirmed in the two Draft Covenants completed by the Commission on Human Rights 150 includes "permanent sovereignty over
their natural wealth and resources."1 51 Thus, Resolution 1314
(XIII) gave birth to the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty
(Commission). The monumental task facing the Commission

consisted of determining the nature of the right of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources; the manner in which that
right should be exercised; and what measures should be taken
into account according to international law. 152
At its first meeting in May 1959, the Commission directed the
Secretariat of the United Nations to prepare a study on the status
of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources.1 5 3
Because of the perception that the report was incomplete, the
Commission adopted a resolution requesting the Secretariat to
revise the study and to submit such revision to the Commission
by March 15, 1961.15

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 861.
Banerjee, supranote 113, at 525.
Id.
G.A. Res. 1314, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., 788th plen. mtg. (1958),

reprinted in 7 UNrrED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 121 (Duson J.
Djonovich ed., 1973).
150. Id. See also U.N. SCOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 7, annex I, UN Doc.
E/2573 (1955) (two draft Covenants completed by Commission on Human
Rights).
151.
152.
153.
154.

G.A. Res. 1314, supranote 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Several delegations still opposed the Secretariat's revised
During this debate, Chile and the Soviet Union
study.15 5
submitted draft resolutions. 15 6 The controversy over these two
alternative resolutions focused on the issue of whether the right
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was an absolute
right or whether it was a right limited by obligations and
responsibilities imposed by international law. 15 7 During 1960,
while the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty struggled to
define the scope of permanent sovereignty, the General Assembly
again emphasized its concern with the concept in a Resolution
entitled "Concerted Action for Economic Development of
Economically Less Developed Countries." 158
In 1961, the General Assembly had before it the Secretariat's
report and the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty's report,
In
transmitted without consideration by the ECOSOC.1 5 9
Resolution 1720 (XVI), the General Assembly thanked the
Secretariat for its report, requested that both reports be printed,
and decided to continue its work at the Second Committee's next
session. 160
4. Debates Preceding Resolution 1803
Debate ensued in the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty
and in the Second Committee, culminating in the General
Assembly's adoption of Resolution 1803, which dealt expressly
The
with permanent sovereignty over natural resources.161
United States, previously opposed to any resolution on permanent
sovereignty, espoused the capital-exporting states' position that,
in the event of nationalization, prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation should be paid. The issue of compensation was
resolved with a majority of the Commission and the Committee
members insisting that states had a duty to pay compensation for
takings as a general principle of international law. 162 However,

155. Baneijee, supra note 113, at 526.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 526-27.
158. G.A. Res. 1515, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 948th plen. mtg. (1960),
reprintedin 8 UNITED NATIONS RESOIIMONS 134 (Dusan J. Djonvich ed., 1974).
159. Banerjee, supra note 113, at 527.
160. G.A. Res. 1720, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 198th plen. mtg. 91961),
reprinted in 8 UNrIED NATIONS RESOLUIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 256 (Dusan J.

Djonovich ed., 1974).
161. Banerjee, supra note 113, at 528.
162. 1&at530.
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views differed with regard to the conditions that require states to
pay such compensation. 16
5. Resolution 1803
Resolution 1803,164 entitled "Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources," constitutes the broadest, most explicit
declaration from the United Nations on the subject. 16 5 The
Resolution again links the concepts of permanent sovereignty,
economic independence, and self-determination. 166 While authorizing nationalization, expropriation, and requisitioning, Resolution 1803 emphasizes "mutual respect of States based on their
167
sovereign equality."
In evaluating Resolution 1803, an important inconsistency
must be noted: the Resolution fails to clarify who possesses the
right of permanent sovereignty. Because of this inconsistency,
several scholars have argued that the concept of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources is invalid as a legal
principle. 168 In any event, the concept of permanent sovereignty
embodied in Resolution 1803 paves the way for the establishment
of the so-called new international economic order.

163. Id. at 531.
164. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1194th plen. mtg. (1962),
reprinted in 9 UNrrED NATIONS RESOLUTONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 103 (Dusan J.
Djonovich ed., 1972).
165. See supratext accompanying notes 114, 116, 150-52, 160 (discussing
the resolutions cited in the preamble of General Assembly Resolution 1803).
166. G.A. Res. 1803, supranote 164.
167. Id. (quoting para. 4 of G.A. Res. 1803). The issues of nationalization
and compensation, while highly controversial and of great import, are beyond the
scope of this Article. For in-depth discussions of these issues, see Karol N. Gess,
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 13 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 398,
420-35 (1964).
See also P.J. O'Keefe, The United Nations and Permanent
Sovereignty Over NaturalResources, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 239, 251-75 (1974) (discussing nationalization and compensation historically and in the context of
Resolution 1803).
168. See O'Keefe, supra note 167, at 243-46; Gess, supranote 165, at 414
(noting that Japan and others expressed the view that the concept of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources lacks legal validity).
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6. Other Developments: 1963-66
a. Secretary-General's Report: 1963
The last portion of Resolution 1803 requested the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations to continue the study on
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and to report to the
ECOSOC and to the General Assembly at its Eighteenth Session,
if possible.169 Pursuant to this request, the Secretariat issued its
report in November 1963.170 Among other things, the report
examined national measures affecting ownership and the use of
natural resources by foreigners, with emphasis on the developing
states.1 7 1 The report also discussed state succession, as well as
arbitration and conciliation measures being employed. 172
b. The ECOSOC Session: 1964
The ECOSOC considered the Secretary-General's Report at its
Thirty-seventh Session in Geneva, in July and August of 1964.173
The ECOSOC failed to adopt a resolution dealing with the concept
of permanent sovereignty, but it submitted the Report and some
general comments to the General Assembly. 174
c. The Second Committee's Session: 1965
The Second Committee briefly considered the issue of
permanent sovereignty at its Twentieth Session in 1965.175 Because of the sharp differences raised by the United States and
others, 17 6 the Second Committee postponed further discussion on
permanent sovereignty until the next session of the General
Assembly.177

169.
G.A. Res. 1803, supranote 164 (quoting part III).
170.
Baneijee, supranote 113, at 535.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id. at 536.
176.
The United States submitted an amendment to the Algeria, Poland, et
al. draft joint resolution. Id. at 537. In the amendment, the United States
emphasized the sharp division in opinion between capital-importing states and

capital-exporting states.
177.

Id.
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d. Special Committee Debate: 1966
In 1966, the concept of permanent sovereignty was discussed
by the Special Committee on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
(Special Committee). 178 The Special Committee, established by
resolution 1966 (XVIII) of the General Assembly, 17 9 debated the
issue of whether or not permanent sovereignty over natural
resources constituted a fundamental element of the sovereign
equality of states.1 8 0 However, the Special Committee failed to
reach an agreement as to whether this right was qualified by
obligations and duties arising from international law. 181
e. The Second Committee's Session: 1966
In October and November of 1966, the Second Committee
continued its discussions on permanent sovereignty, considering
the Secretary-General's report and the relevant records of the
ECOSOC.1 8 2 The draft resolution ultimately adopted by the
Second Committee largely was the product of the less-developed
states' efforts during the debate.1 8 3 The Committee ultimately
adopted a draft resolution, after numerous amendments,
by a
18 4
vote of one hundred and four to zero, with six abstentions.
7. Resolution 2158
18 5
Following the recommendation of the Second Committee,
the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2158 (XXI), entitled
"Permanent sovereignty over natural resources."1 8 6 The primary
focus of the Resolution is accelerated economic and technological

178.

Id.

179.
180.
181.

Id. at 535.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.

182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 540.

184.

Id.

185.
See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (discussing Second
Committee's debate and recommendation).
186.
G.A. Res. 2158, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1478th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/6518 91966), reprinted in 11 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUI1ONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY
145 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1975).
The General Assembly adopted the
Resolution by a vote of 104 in favor, none against, with six abstentions. Banerjee,
supranote 113, at 540.
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growth for the developing states in the area of natural resources
Thus, Resolution 2158 represents a strong
exploitation.1 8 7
statement against concession agreements of the past, and affirms
the new concept of permanent sovereignty as a method of
increasing the economic and technological development of
less-developed states and ensuring their right to freely exploit
their own natural resources. Although the resolution recognizes
the need for foreign capital in exploiting natural resources,1 8 8 the
Resolution clearly contemplates the movement away from this
type of exploitation of natural resources toward having the lessdeveloped states develop their own resources. 189
B. PermanentSovereignty and the Creation
of a New Economic Order
The less-developed states' success in establishing the
principle of permanent sovereignty evolved into a push for a new
world order. The United Nations seemed to adopt this goal as an
extension of the concept of permanent sovereignty. For example,
the Preamble to Resolution 2626, adopted in 1970, emphasized
that "[e]very country has the right and duty to develop its human
and natural resources, but the full benefit of its efforts can be
realized only with concomitant and effective international
action."1 90 Thus, the Resolution called for a progression from an
old world order to a new economic world order.
The new international order was foreshadowed by the
passage of Resolution 3171 in 1973, which strongly affirmed the
inalienable right of states to permanent sovereignty over natural
This Resolution expressly supported developing
resources.191
struggle to regain control over their natural
states "in their
19 2
resources."

187.

G.A. Res. 2158, supra note 186.

188. Id.
See id. (calling upon developed states to assist developing states'
189.
internal development efforts).

190.

G.A. Res. 2626 , U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., at para. 10, U.N. Doc.

A/8124 (1970), reprinted in 13 UNITED NATIONS RESOLLnIIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY
255, 256 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1976).
G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1973),
191.
reprintedin 14 UNTED NATIONS RESOLUIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 422 (Dusan J.
Djonovich ed., 1978).
Id.
192.
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1974

In preparation for a Special Session of the General Assembly
in 1974, the. Group of Seventy-Seven, which represents the
developing states, drafted two documents to present to the
General Assembly: a Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order and a Programme of Action. 19 3 The

issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was one of

the major topics. 19 4
The states of the European Economic
Community (EEC), the United States, Japan, and Australia
insisted upon linking the concept of permanent sovereignty with
other rules of international law. 19 5 Debate ensued over whether
the concepts should be linked in the draft documents. This
debate underscores the increasing vocalization by developing
states of the need for a new international economic order.
2. The New International Economic Order
The vocalizations culminated in the Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Declaration)l 9 6 and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order (Programme).19 7 The General
Assembly adopted the Declaration without a vote. 198
The
Declaration called for the establishment of a new international
economic order 19 9 and contains twenty principles on which the
new international order should be founded. For instance, the
promotion of foreign investment, inter alia, is recommended in
2° °
order to fmance the development of less-developed states.

193.
JUHA KUUSI, THE HoST STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION 129
(1979). See also Study of the Problems of Raw Materials and Development, U.N.
GAOR, ad hoc comm., 6th Spec. Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc.
A/9556 (1974).
194. Id.
195. Id.

196. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. 1, 2229th pln.
mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 14 UNITED NATONS RESOLLIMONS
527 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1978).
197.
G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. 1, 2229th pin.
mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprintedin 14 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUT[ONS

529 (Dujan J. Djonovich ed., 1978).
198. G.A. Res. 3201, supranote 196.
199. Id.
200. Id. art. II.
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More significantly, the Programme establishes new guidelines
for dealing with foreign investors, calling for "an international
code of conduct for the transfer of technology corresponding to
needs and conditions prevalent in developing countries" 20 1 and
"an international code of conduct for transnational corporations.
• . ."02 Both the Declaration and the Programme attempt to
establish a major structural change in, and to prescribe
2 03
standards for, state behavior in the international economy.
The documents purport to cover the whole arena of international
economic relations.
3. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
The General Assembly also adopted the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (Charter)2 °4 in order "to establish or
improve norms of universal application for the development 20of5
international economic relations on a just and equitable basis."
The Charter lists fifteen principles which, inter alia, "shall" govern
international economic relations.2 ° 6 Article 2 of the Charter
expressly addresses the concept of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources and the regulation of transnational
corporations. 20 7 Article 17 also touches on the concept of
permanent sovereignty, stressing the need to accelerate the
of developing states while respecting their
economic development
20 8
sovereign equality.
While some scholars have criticized the Charter for its
dichotomous nature, 2 0 9 they uniformly recognize the change in
international economic relations which this document-combined
2 10
with the Declaration and the Programme-attempts to effect.

201.

G.A. Res. 3202, supra note 197, art. IV(a).

202.
203.

Id art. V.
Jonathan Dubitzky, The General Assembly's InternationalEconomics,

16 HAWV. INVI, L.J. 670, 670 (1975).

204. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2315th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/9946 (1974), reprintedin 15 UNIED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY
300 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1984).
205. G.A. Res. 3082, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. 30, 2192nd plen. mtg.,
at 40, U.N. Doc. A/9379 (1974), reprinted in 14 UNIED NATIONS RESOLUTONS:
GENERALASSEMBLY 400 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1978).
206. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 204, at ch. I. The Working Group rejected
a proposal utilizing the term "should" instead of the mandatory term "shall."
Dubitsky, supranote 203, at 672.
207. G.A. Res. 3281, supranote 204, at ch. II, art. 2.
208. Id. ch. If, art. 17.
209. See, e.g., Dubitzky, supranote 203, at 672.
210. See, e.g., KUUSI, supra note 193, at 44; Dubitzky, supra note 203, at
670.
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V. TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR HOLDING CONSTITUTIONALLY
RESPONSIBLE RULERS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR
ACTS OF INDIGENOUS SPOLIATION

A. The Doctrine of Individual Responsibility
Holding high-ranking public officials individually responsible
for their acts while in office is no longer the novel idea that it was
five decades ago. The War Crimes Tribunals played a central role
in affirming the principle of individual culpability. The Nuremberg Tribunals established that individuals can be held
responsible as individuals for conduct that breaches international
law.2 1 1 The Nuremberg Principles were bolstered when they were
affinmed by the United Nations General Assembly on December
11, 1946.212 In 1991 the International Law Committee (ILC)
brought this process of formulation, codification, and progressive
development of international law to a close when it adopted a
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
21 3
(Draft Code).
Article 3(1) of the 1991 Draft Code states that "[a]ny
individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of
21 4
mankind is responsible therefor and is liable to punishment."

This Article reflects the first paragraph of Article 6 of the
Nuremberg Charter, which contains the most important
provisions on individual culpability for particular offenses under

211. See NAZI-CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 66 (1940) (hereinafter Judgment
at Nuremberg); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 529 (1993).
212. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by
the Charter of Nfirnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946), reprinted in 1 UNITED NAtiON RESOLIJTONS 175
(Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1972).
213. Draft Code of CrimesAgainst the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1954],
2 Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 150, U.N. Doc. A/2693; see also Fifth Report on the Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1987] 1 Y.B. INr'L L.
COMM'N 4, U.N. DOC. ACN.4/404; Draft Articles of the Draft Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/43/539 (1988); Seventh Report on
the Draft Code of Crimes (1988); Seventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1989] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 81, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/419 [hereinafter Draft Code of Crimes]; Draft Codes of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1991] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMN 79, U.N.
Doc. A/CM4/.435 [hereinafter 1991 Draft Code of Crimes].
214. See 1991 Draft Code of Crimes, supranote 213.
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international law.2 15 Article 3 of the Draft Code reaffirms the
position taken by the International Military Tribunal that
international law imposes human duties directly on both public
and private authors of an international crime. The position was
again reinforced in the judgment in the Flick Trial, which again
was based16 on the provisions of law formulated in the Nuremberg
2
Charter.
The noose for individual responsibility is tied so tightly that
even heads of states are not spared. Article 13 of the Draft Code
provides that individuals' official positions do not relieve them of
personal responsibility for committing crimes against the peace
and security of mankind. Article 13 singles out chief executives,
making it clear that the "fact that [an individual] acts as head of
state or Government, does not relieve him of criminal respon2 17
sibility."
The Draft Code deliberately limits criminal responsibility and
the resulting punishment to the individual alone; states are
excluded from punishment. Nevertheless, the doctrine of state
Nuremberg also established
responsibility is retained.2 18
conclusively that international law forms the bases for personal
culpability; reliance on provisions of national law is not
necessary. Individual responsibility attaches when: (1) the
wrongful conduct does not constitute a crime under municipal
law, and/or (2) the act constitutes an international crime but its
commission was compelled under municipal law. 2 19 Article 2 of
the Draft Code reaffir-ms this doctrine of the supremacy of
international law over municipal law. 22 0 Article 2 tracks the language of Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter in defming crimes
in
against humanity as certain acts committed "whether or 2not
21
violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated."
Although the principle of personal accountability for international crimes is now widely accepted, there is still no definitive
list of acts that would qualify as international crimes to which
individual responsibility can be ascribed. The Nuremberg Charter

215. See Agreement on the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis Powers, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279, entered into force, Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter Agreement on Prosecution of
Criminals]. The United States entered the agreement on September 10, 1945. Id.
216. See UNITED NATIONS WAR COMMISSION, 15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 121 (1949).
217. 1991 Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 213, at art. 13.

218.
219.

Id. art. 3 (commentary).
PEIERDROST, 2 THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 152 (1959).

220. See Draft Code of Crimes, supranote 213; see also 1991 Draft Code of
Crimes, supra note 213, at art. I.
221. 1991 Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 213, art. 2.
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listed three crimes for which individual responsibility attaches:
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. 2 2 2 Later, the crimes of genocide,2 2 3 apartheid, 22 4 and
torture would be added.2 2 5 The Draft Code includes, inter alia, all
of these crimes among those that incur individual
responsibility. 22 6 Pre- and post-Nuremberg practice suggests that
such conduct, by the nature of its seriousness, undermines the
very foundations of human society, such that its proscription is
properly addressed by the community of states.
Article 1 of the Draft Code and the accompanying
commentary offer some useful guidelines in making the
determination of whether particular conduct has risen to the level
of an international crime. Article 1 provides that "[t]he crimes
[under international law] defined in this Code constitute crimes
against the peace and security of manldnd."2 2 7 In deciding what
defines these crimes, the ILC was torn between a conceptual
definition that would establish the essential elements of such a
crime and an enumerative definition incorporating a list of

individual crimes defined a priori in the Draft Code. 22 8 The ILC

222.
See CHARTER OFTE INTIERNAIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter NUREMBERG CHARTER], art. 6; see also
Draft Code of Crimes, supranote 210, at princ. VI.
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
223.

Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 4, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951.
224. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of "Apartheid," opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, art. III, entered into
force, July 18, 1976. The United Nations General Assembly later adopted the
Convention.
See G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 285th plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 30, 75, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3068 (1974), reprintedin 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
225. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted, Dec. 10, 1984. U.N.G.A. Res.
39/46 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72,
Annex (1984), (entered into force, June 26, 1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1984).
226. The 1991 Draft Code of Crimes lists as crimes against the peace and
security of manldnd: aggression (art. 15); threats of aggression (art. 16);
intervention (art. 17); colonial domination and other forms of alien domination
(art. 18); systematic or mass violations of human rights, for example murder,
torture, and slavery (art. 21); exceptionally serious war crimes (art. 22);
recruitment, use, financing, and training of mercenaries (art. 23); international

terrorism (art. 24); illicit traffic in narcotic drugs (art. 25); and willful and severe
damage to the environment (art. 26). 1991 Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 213,
at 95-97.
227. 1991 Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 213, at 94.
228. Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
[1987] 2 Y.B. INI% L. COMM'N 1324, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (discussing the
commentary to article 1).
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ultimately opted for definition by enumeration. While eschewing
a broad conceptual definition, the Commission nevertheless
identified "seriousness" as the essential element of a crime
against the peace and security of mankind.2 2 9 Recognizing that
seriousness can be established on the basis of subjective and
objective factors, the ILC set forth three tests for establishing the
subjective content of the seriousness of an offense: (1) the nature
of the act; (2) the extent of its effects; and (3) the motive of the
perpetrator. 2 30 Alongside these criteria, the ILC also identified
some of the objective factors that go into the definition of
seriousness-essentially violations of rights, physical persons, or
property. 23 1 In short, a serious offense that rises to the level of
an international crime is one that is directed against persons or
property.
The Special Rapporteur on the Draft Code, 23 2 Doudou Thiam,
provided additional clarification on the criteria for establishing the
seriousness of an offense in his Third Report to the General
Assembly. 2 33
Significantly, however, the Special Rapporteur
placed the right to self-determination in the pantheon of serious
violations of international law. 23
This right, as previously
indicated, subsumes the right of a people to dispose freely of their
wealth and natural resources. 235 Therefore, a breach of one is
tantamount to a violation of the other. Thus, on this basis alone,

indigenous spoliation would qualify as an offense against the
peace and security of mankind. However, if this avenue is foreclosed, the "effects".test articulated in the Commentary to Article
1 of the Draft Code provides another basis for treating indigenous
spoliation as an individual international crime. This test defines
a crime against peace and security in terms of the extent of its
effects-more particularly, whether it involves a large number of
victims.

229.
Id. para. 1.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
Thiam was appointed Special Rapporteur by the Commission at its
Thirty-fourth Session in 1982. See 1991 Draft Code of Crimes, supranote 213, at
79, 94. Report of the International Law Commission, [1985], 2 Y.B. INTL L.
COMM'N 63,70-71 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/387.
233. As the Special Rapporteur noted in his Report, article 19 (3) (a-d) of the

Draft Articles on State Responsibility lists these breaches as examples of the most
serious violations of international law. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
[1976] 2 Y.B. INTL L. COMM'N 53-55, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1976/Add.1
(Commentary to article 19).
234. Report of the International Law Commission, [19851, 2 Y.B. INTL L.
COMM'N 63, 70-71 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/387.
235.
See discussion supra part IV.
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The 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes reflects the expectations
of the international community with respect to the most serious
international offenses committed by individuals: these crimes
undermine the foundations of human society, and the
perpetrators should be held individually responsible. However,
the Draft Code was never intended to be viewed as an exhaustive
236
list.

The Draft Code makes it clear that the enumerated crimes

"could be supplemented at any time by new instruments of the
same legal nature."2 3 7 Wanton acts of depredation carried out by
high-ranking public officials, which have led to the financial and
economic ruin of numerous states, belong to this category of
offenses that "attack the very foundations of human existence, injure the vital interests of the international community and were
regarded as criminal by that community as a whole."2 38 The victims-individuals and groups-representing states from the major
regions of the world have uniformly reacted with horror and
outrage at the systematic destruction of their common patrimony.
The challenge facing the international community is to begin to
reflect these individual and societal forms of moral judgment in
their state practice.
1. The Link Between Permanent Sovereignty and Indigenous
Spoliation
In the debates and discussions leading to the inclusion of the
principle of permanent sovereignty in a number of international
human rights documents,2 39 the focus was on two related rights:
the right of states to exercise control over their natural wealth
and resources, and the right of all peoples freely to use, exploit,
and dispose of their natural wealth and resources. The doctrine
of permanent sovereignty arose in the context of relations between
host states and transnational enterprises engaged in the
exploitation of natural resources. As a result, the right of the
state to legislate for the public good with respect to the natural
resources and economic activities in its territory has become the
most common construction given to the doctrine of permanent
sovereignty. However, this focus is misplaced. First of all, Article
236.

See Summary Records of the Meetings of the Thirty-Ninth Session,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/403, p. 12, para. 37 (Remarks by Mr. Tomuschat).

237.

Id.para. 4.

238.
Summarj Records of the Meetings of the 1993d Meeting, [1987] 2 Y.B.
INr'LL. COMM'N 12, para. 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/403 (Remarks by Mr. Barsegov).
239.
See discussion suprapart IV.
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21(5) of the African Charter requires states "to eliminate all forms
of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practised by

international monopolies."24 0 Thus, the African Charter singles
out foreign multinationals from all the possible exploiters,
including state governments.
A second problem with this
interpretation of permanent sovereignty is that it pins all the
responsibility on foreigners, thus permitting the exploitation of
finite Third World natural wealth and resources to continue
unabated by indigenous exploiters.
The right of all peoples freely to use, exploit, and dispose of
their natural wealth and resources is usually given short shrift in
scholarly commentaries. 2 4 1 This neglect is unfortunate because a
review of the travaux pr~paratoires on the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant as well as the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Covenant reveals that representatives consistently spoke of
the rights of peoples and states over their wealth and natural
resources. 2 42 These and other instruments have incorporated
specific provisions on the right of peoples. 2 4
Furthermore, all
these provisions appear in instruments dealing with human

240.
African Charter on Human and People's Rights, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982).
241.
See, e.g. Kamal Hossain, Introduction in PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ix (Kamal Hossain & Subrata Roy
Chowdhury eds. 1984) (noting that the principle of permanent sovereignty must

be understood in the context of the efforts of developing states to restructure
inequitable and onerous concession-type arrangements erected during the
colonial period); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH
CONFERENCE, MONTREAL, 1982, at 197 (noting that the principle underlines the
domestic jurisdiction of states with regard to the natural resources within their
national boundaries); OSCAR SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 172
(1977) (noting that the "principle of permanent sovereignty has become the focal
normative conception used by States to justify their right to exercise control over
production and distribution arrangements without being hampered by the
international law of State responsibility as it had been traditionally interpreted by
the capital-exporting countries . . . .").
But see Subrata Roy Chowdhury,
Permanent Sovereignty and its Impact on Stabilization Clauses, Standards of
Compensation and Patterns of Development Co-operation in PERMANENT
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 42 (noting
that the right of all peoples to use, exploit, and dispose of their natural wealth
and resources is an important component of the principle of permanent
sovereignty).
242. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
MARK J. BOSSrYT, GUIDE TO THE 'TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES' OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1987); Covenant on the Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (enteredinto force Jan. 3, 1976).
243.
See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,
opened for signature,Aug. 23, 1978. art. 13, 17 I.L.M. 1488, 1495.
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rights, thus suggesting that the rights mentioned attach to people
qua human beings and not only to the states parties. 2 "
Although these instruments incorporate "peoples" rights,
they are deliberately silent on the meaning of "peoples" or
"nations." However, the definition of "peoples" is critical to
appreciating the full import of, for example, Article 2(2) of the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant. Article 21(4) of the African
Charter, however, suggests that "peoples" refers to the state. 2 45
Equating peoples with states makes sense inasmuch as people act
through states and state-sponsored agencies. However, "peoples"
could also mean all persons within the state: in that case the
power of the state to dispose freely of natural wealth and
resources would be subject to the consent of all persons within
the state. This meaning of "peoples" reflects the democratic ideal.
In this situation, the citizenry would exercise their collective right
against the state to benefit from the state's wealth and natural resources.
2. Permanent Sovereignty and the Public Trust Doctrine
Whether the state exercises the right of free disposal alone or
subject to the consent of the people, two issues still must be
addressed. First, what rules will guide the disposal? Second,
who constitutes the "state"? Article 21(3) of the African Charter
and Article 1(2) in both the Civil and Political Rights Covenant
and the Economic and Social Rights Covenant define the
parameters within which natural resources may be exploited:
"[aill peoples may

. . .

freely dispose of their natural wealth and

resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principles of
mutual benefit, and international law."24
These instruments
also contain specific rules that states are required to follow in
their dealings with foreigners on matters pertaining to the

244. See Louis Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights As "Rights", 1 CARDOZO
L. REV. 425, 438-42 (1979).
245. G.A. Res. 3281, supranote 204, at art. (2)(1). The argument has been
made that Article 2(1) of the Charter transforms the peoples' right into a duty of
states. See Paul Peters et al., PermanentSovereignty, ForeignInvestment and State
Practice, in PERMMNENT SOVEREIGNIY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 241, at 88, 95-96.
246. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 242,
art. 1(2); Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supranote 242, art.
1(2).

1995]

THE CRIME OF PATRIMONICIDE

exploitation of natural wealth and resources. 2 47 However, with
respect to the relations between the states and the peoples, there
are very few concrete guidelines on how this exploitation can be
accomplished.
After determining who may dispose of natural wealth and
resources, a clarification of how natural wealth and resources
may be disposed is still needed. In short, is the state accountable
and, if so, to whom? The answer to this question lies in how one
conceptualizes the state. Rather than determining "what," we
should be determining 'who," is the state. For example, if one
were to suggest to a Zairean subsistence farmer that it is the
state's responsibility to ensure that Zaire's vast mineral wealth is
put to use for his best interest, that suggestion is likely to elicit a
stare suggesting disbelief. To him, the state is President Mobutu,
the tax collector, or the principal in the local public elementary
school. In order for the statement-that the state exercises the
right of free disposal-to make sense to this farmer and the
millions of similarly situated compatriots, the focus ought to be
on these human faces. Therefore, one should ask what rules, if
More
any, limit government officials' power to dispose?
particularly, can these men and women be made accountable to
the people?
The military junta in Nigeria must have wrestled with this
question when it seized power in 1984. As part of a national
campaign to stamp out official corruption, the Federal Military
Government headed by General Badamosi Babangida arrested,
detained, investigated, and punished many prominent office2 48
holders from previous civilian and military administrations.
The Nigerian government was expressing a view about the proper
relationship between leaders and followers. The notion that
public office-holders are servants of the people and that government owes its citizens special duties of care or stewardship is at
More specifically, that
the heart of democratic governance.
citizens have an indefeasible public interest in their national
wealth and resources placed under the guardianship of their
government is a rarely contested proposition. If this concept is
what the military junta had in mind, then it was merely restating

247. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 164 ("Nationalization,
expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public
utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign."); see also G.A. Res.
3281, supranote 204, at art. 2(2)(c).
248. See Decree No. 3 1984 (1986), The Recovery of Public Property (Special
Military Tribunals) para. 3(c) (codified in XXI LAWS OF THE FEDERAION OF NIGERIA
(REVISED) ch. 389 (1990)).
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the public trust doctrine. This doctrine, in turn, provides a
context within which one can construct a framework for holding
the guardians of the peoples' wealth accountable for their
stewardship.
Basic to the public trust doctrine is the deceptively simple
idea that the state owes its citizens special duties of care, or
stewardship, with respect to certain "common property" public
resources that comprise the wealth of the state. 2 4 9 A number of
subjects can be included among "common property" public
resources. Thus, the "wealth" referred to in the various
international covenants-even if viewed as meaning all the
property in existence at any given time that has a money value,
exchange value, or economic utility-would be included in an

249.

In the United States, this doctrine has held sway for at least a century.

See Gregory F. Cook, The Public Trust Doctrinein Alaska, 8 J. ENVL L. & LITIG. 1, 4
n.7 1993. It has been held to include, inter alia, protection of navigational and

commercial fishing rights over tidelands (Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16

Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)); recreational fishing, boating, swimming, water siding, and
other related purposes (Wlbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Act of June 3, 1985 Relating to the Navigable or
Public Waters of the State, ch -82, § 1(c), codified in 1985 ALASKA TEMPORARY &
SPECIAL ACTS); protection of the public's right to hunt (Bell v. Town of Wells, 557
A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Opinion of Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass.
1981); Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Eberhard, 230 A.2d 644 (Md. 1967);
Hartford v. Gilmanton, 146 A.2d 851 (N.H. 1958); Swan Island Club Inc. v. White,
114 F.Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1953), aff'd sub nom. Swan Island Club, Inc. v.
Yarborough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954)); protection of fish and wildlife habitat
(Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085
(Idaho 1983); Smithtown v. Poveromo, 336 N.Y.S. 2d 764 (1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 359 N.Y.S. 2d (1973); Just v. Marienette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
1972)); recreational access to the ocean (County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d
57 (Haw. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974)); sunbathing, swimming, other
shore activities, and access to and use of shorelands and upland dry sand beaches (Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)); enjoyment of scenic beauty (City of Madison v.
Wisconsin, 83 N.W. 2d 674, 678 (Wis. 1957); Obrecht v. Nat'1 Gypsum Co., 105
N.W. 2d 143, 149-51 (Mich. 1960)); conservation of fishery resources (Gilbert v.
Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game, Bd. of Fisheries, 803 P.2d 391, 398-99 (Alaska
1990); McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989); Owsichek v. State, Guide
Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 492-96 (Alaska 1988); Nathanson v.
Alaska, 554 P.2d 456, 458 n.9 (Alaska 1976); Metlakatla Indian Community v.
Egan, 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), afj'd, 369 U.S. 45 (1962)); conservation of
wildlife resources (Herscher v. Alaska Dep't of Commerce, 568 P.2d 996, 1005
(Alaska 1977); Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 492-96; McDowell, 785 P.2d at 12-18;
Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 398-399; Matthews, 471 A.2d at 361); water and minerals
(Herscher,568 P.2d at 1003); and existing and future recreational uses (Act of
June 3, 1985, supra).
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expanded list of "common property" public resources governed by
the public trust doctrine.
If the doctrine of permanent sovereignty is taken to mean (1)
the people's right to dispose freely of their wealth and natural
resources, and (2) the exercise of this right in their exclusive
interest, then it can only be explained in the context of the public
trust doctrine. First, the wealth and natural resources referred to
resources
public
property"
"common
constitute
would
representing the entire wealth of the state. Second, this wealth is
held in constructive trust for the people by their constitutionally
elected and appointed leaders. Finally, these leaders, in their
roles as trustees, are expected to act as the representatives for the
benefit of all the people in common.
B. The FiduciaryRelationship and the Public Trust Doctrine
What is a fiduciary relationship as envisaged by the public
Historically, courts, in the exercise of their
trust doctrine?
equitable jurisdiction, have defined the scope and extent of
equitable rights and duties appurtenant to the public trust doctrine.2 5 0 Accordingly, among the many duties a trustee owes to
the beneficiaries of the trust are a duty of loyalty-the duty not to
engage in self-dealing-and a duty to preserve trust property.
1. The Duty of Loyalty
A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary "to administer the
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." 2 5 ' In this context,
an important distinction can be drawn between leaders holding
public office and the citizens they serve. Political leaders hold
greater power and, therefore, bear far greater moral responsibility
than ordinary citizens.2 52 A state's wealth and resources are
passed down to the citizens and political leaders as the natural
legacy from previous generations. Accordingly, a state's wealth
and resources are to be held in trust for the present generation of
citizens and for those not yet born.

250.

See, e.g., Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461,479 (1901).

251.

RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS§ 170(1) (1959).

252.

Smith, Moral Reasoning and Moral Responsibility in InternationalAffairs

in ETHICS AND INTERNAflONAL RELAIONS 33 (Kenneth Thompson ed., 1985)
[hereinafter Moral Reasoning].
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2. The Duty to Preserve the Trust Property
In addition to the duty of loyalty, the trustee is also under a
duty to the beneficiary to "use reasonable care and skill to
preserve the trust property."25 3 Thus, a certain obligation is
placed upon each generation of political leadership to ensure the
access to this wealth on an equitable basis to all the members of
the present generation. Implicit in this trust is the expectation
that the political leadership will not divert the national wealth
they hold in trust for their personal use. By the same token, there
will be some limits on the extent to which citizens can consume
the fruits of their legacy.
3. Application of These Duties in Spoliation Situations

The aforementioned duties have been breached in a number
of instances. These examples come from the findings of fact made
by properly constituted commissions of inquiry appointed to
investigate two former Presidents of Sierra Leone-Siaka Stevens

and Joseph Momoh 2 -- and other high-ranking cabinet ministers

who served under them.2 5 5
The inquiries focused on their
performances while in office, in particular how well they discharged their duties as guardians of the state's wealth and
resources. These commissions have sat as courts of law, applied
the rules of evidence, and ensured that all persons accused had a

253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 176 (1959).
254. Shortly after overthrowing the civilian government of President Joseph
Momoh in April 1992, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NRCP) set as one
of its principal objectives eradicating corruption, mismanagement, and
indiscipline in the affairs of government. It followed through on its promise when,
by Public Notice No. 172 in the Extraordinary issue of the Sierra Leone Gazette
dated Wednesday, June 13, 1992, it instituted the Justice Beccles-Davies
Commission of Inquiry. See SIERRA LEONE, WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORT OF THE
JUSTICE BECCLES-DAVIES COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ASSETS AND OTHER
MATrERS OF ALL PERSONS WHO WERE PRESIDENTS, VICE-PRESIDENTS, MINISTERS,
MINISTERS OF STATE AND DEPUIY MINISTERS WfrhIN THE PERIOD FROM THE 1ST DAY OF
JUNE, 1986, TO THE 22ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1991, AND TO INQUIRE INTO AND
INVESTIGATE WHETHER SUCH ASSETS WERE ACQUIRED LAWFULLY OR UNLAWFULLY (1993)
[hereinafter SIERRA LEONE WHITE PAPER ON JUSTICE BECCLES-DAVIES COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY].
255.
See SIERRA LEONE, WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORT OF THE MRS. JUSTICE
LAURA MARCUS-JONES COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ASSETS, ACTIVITIES AND
OTHER RELATED MATTERS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD AND
EMPLOYEES OF PARASTATALS, EX-MINISTERS OF STATES, PARAMOUNT CHIEFS AND ON
CONTRACTORS-WITHIN THE PERIOD 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 1986 TO THE 22ND DAY OF
SEPTEMBER, 1991 (1993).
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right to be represented by counsel, regardless of whether they
chose to exercise that right.2 5 6 Thus, the findings of fact made by
these tribunals are entitled to the same respect traditionally
accorded such conclusions when reached by courts in the United
States and other legal systems.
The stewardship of Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh was
meticulously dissected by the Marcus-Beccles Commission. The
Commission found that Stevens and Momoh, in the discharge of
their high office as guardian of the state's wealth and resources,
put their personal interests above those of the people of Sierra
Leone and failed to exercise the care and skill necessary to
preserve the common public property of all Sierra Leoneans.
In the case of Siaka Stevens, the Commission found that,
during his tenure of office, 25 7 his total income from the state was
Le 271,975.258
Yet during this period, Stevens was able to
acquire an extensive real estate portfolio consisting of sixteen
houses, including Kabassa Lodge, which is currently valued at
$5,850,000.259 In the investigation of Joseph Momoh, who was
President from November 1985 to April 1992, the Commission
uncovered evidence that paints a picture of a head of state who
became a millionaire several times over in the relatively short

period he was in office.

During this seven year period, he

acquired a "sizeable collection of real property,"2 60 including
homes and farms, a fleet of twenty-three expensive vehicles, Le
12,950,000 in Treasury Bills, cash deposits in various banks in
Sierra Leone totalling Le 45,613,870.22, cash deposits in various
banks abroad totalling Le 128,478.73 and $30,000, 110,000
26 1
shares in a local insurance company, and much more.
Testifying before the Beccles-Davies Commission, Momoh's
own Finance Minister, Hassan Gbassay Kanu, described Momoh's
conduct throughout his term as President of Sierra Leone as one
that "inflicted the severest mismanagement of the affairs of the

256.
See REPUBLIC OF GHANA, REPORT OF THE GHANA JIAGGE COMMISSION, para.
2 (1967). The Jiagge Commission and over seventy other commissions of inquiry
that were appointed to probe high level official corruption in Ghana were all
appointed under the provisions of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1964 (Act
250), N.L.C. Decree No. 72, August, 18, 1966, as amended N.L.C. Decrees No.
101, November 1, 1966 and N.L.C. Decree No. 129, January 24, 1967.
257.
Stevens served first as Prime Minister, 1968-80, then as President,

1980-88.
258.
SIERRA LEONE WHrTE PAPER ON JUSTICE BECCLES-DAVIES COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY, supranote 254, at para. 5.
259. Id.
260.
Id. para. 2.
261.
Id.
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people of this country."26 2 For its part, the Commission reached
the following conclusions:
i.
Dr. Momoh was in control of pecuniary resources and
property disproportionate to his past official emoluments;
ii. Evidence of corruption, dishonesty, and abuse of his office

for private benefit by him and in collaboration with other persons
has been established; and
iii. Dr. Momoh acted wilfully and corruptly in a manner which

resulted in loss and damage to Government.263

These two case studies exemplify how some heads of states
have treated their states like cash cows, exploiting their resources
and using them as conduits to channel funds to their private
accounts. They also demonstrate how the ruthless pursuit of
self-interest can steadily impoverish the very people whom these
leaders were elected to serve and protect.
C. The FiduciaryRelationshipin the InternationalSphere
The fiduciary relationship concept has been applied in the
international sphere as well. The origins of an international
fiduciary duty can be traced to the United Nations Trusteeship

System. 264

Chapter XII of the UN Charter and the various

trusteeship agreements that grew out of the Charter provide the
legal framework for analyzing this principle. 26 5 By selecting the
term "trusteeship" to describe the relationship between an
administered territory and the administering authority, the
drafters of the UN Charter intended to make the administering
power accountable for its actions in the non-self-governing
territories. In theory, if not necessarily in practice, the trustee
states assumed fiduciary obligations
to act in the best interests of
2 66
the non-self-governing territories.
A trusteeship arrangement suggests a trust, a trustee, and a
beneficiary. Presumably the architects of the UN Trusteeship
System knew what a trusteeship arrangement entailed and
selected the term fully aware of its common usage.2 6 7 National
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
Nauru, 8

Id. para. 7.
Id. para.4
U.N. CHARTER ch. XII.
Id.
See Comment, InternationalFiduciaryDuty: Australia'sTrusteeship Over
B. U. INT'L L.J. 397, 405-406, n.74 (1990) (hereinafter International

FduciaryDuty).
267. Several writers and jurists who have commented on the Mandate
System, the predecessor to the Trusteeship System, have taken the position that
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and international courts have reinforced the view that trusteeship
agreements were intended to give rise to a fiduciary relationship
creating substantive rights and duties between the peoples of the
non-self-governing territory and their administering authority.
The few cases involving the International Trusteeship System that
have been argued before the International Court of Justice have
provided the court with an opportunity to make some general
2 68
In the
comments about the nature of the trustee's obligations.
South West Africa Case, for example, the court reaffin-med part of
an earlier opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice
that dealt with the Mandate System. 2 6 9 Accordingly, the court
stated that the Mandate System "was created, in the interest of
the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general, as an
international institution with an international object-a sacred
trust of civilization." 270 The court then noted that "[tihe acceptance of a mandate on these terms connoted the assumption of
obligations not only of a moral but also of a binding legal
character."2 7 1 Moreover, "as a corollary of the trust, 'securities
for [its] performance' were instituted in the form of legal
2 72
accountability for its discharge and fulfillment.... "
The rights and duties arising under a trusteeship system
have also been addressed by United States courts. In the case of
2 73
the
People of Saipan v. United States Department of Interior,
Ninth Circuit ruled that trusteeship agreements give rise to
At issue was whether the
substantive rights and duties.
Trusteeship Agreement created for the citizens of the Trust

there was explicit reliance on three private law terms: tutelage, mandate, and
trust. See generally J.L. Brierly, Trusts and Mandates, 1929 BRIT. Y.B. INTrL L.
217; QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 376 (1930);
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128
(separate opinion of Judge Arnold McNair); Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. 16, 198-99, June 21
(separate opinion of Judge F. De Castro); I.C.J. Pleadings, Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 99 (oral
statement of Mr. Elias); see also InternationalFiduciaryDuty, supra note 266.
See, e.g., Southwest African Case, supra; Case Concerning the
268.
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15 (preliminary objections).

269.

The League of Nations' Mandate System was the predecessor of the UN

Trusteeship System. With the demise of the League of Nations, the newly
established United Nations absorbed the former mandated territories under its
jurisdiction. See U.N. CHARTER art. 77, l(a).
Southwest Africa Case, supranote 267, at 29.
270.
Id.
271.
Id.
272.
Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d. 90 (9th Cir. 1974),
273.
cert. denied 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
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Territory any substantive rights that are judicially enforceable.
The court ruled that it did. 27 4 Noting that the substantive rights
guaranteed through the Trusteeship Agreement are not "precisely
defimed," 2 75 the court stated that "[h]owever, we do not believe
that the agreement is too vague for judicial enforcement. Its
language is no more general than such terms as 'due process,'
'seaworthiness,' 'equal protection of the law,' 'good faith,' or
2 76
'restraint of trade,' which courts interpret every day."

VI. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

A. InternationalComplicity
Although acts of spoliation are carried out by indigenous
elites, success depends on the assistance, direct or indirect, they
receive from the international community. The destruction of
national economies that necessarily follows can therefore be
attributed not only to the leaders who treat their national treasuries as their personal accounts, but also to their foreign backers
and aid donors who overlook their excesses for one reason or
another. In hearings conducted by a subcommittee of the United
States House of Representatives on the investments by the
Marcoses in the United States, Congressman Robert Torricelli of
New Jersey addressed the problem of Western complicity. After
reviewing the Marcoses' assets in the United States, Torricelli
concluded that ". . . one day America will be held accountable,
accountable to whether we were complicitous, whether we stood
silent while the Philippine people went further into debt, while Mr.
Marcos and his family feathered their American nest in
2 77
preparation for their eventual departure."
1. The Conspiracy of Silence
As

Congressman

Torricelli's

remarks

reveal,

Western

complicity has been in the form of a studied silence in the face of
spoliation by ruling elites around the world-a silence that has

274.

Id. at 96-97.

275.
276.

Id. at 99.
Id.

277.

PhilippinesHearings,supranote 38, at 264.
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been maintained even when these elites have used force to get
their way. It is no secret that repression has been one of the
favorite and most effective tools employed by dictators to plunder
their economies. Francois Duvalier, for instance, set out early in
his presidency to establish his own praetorian guard-the
dreaded and infamous Tontons Macoutes.278 Duvalier's Macoutes
operated as a paramilitary and mercenary force with arbitrary
powers that were used "widely and wantonly to terrorize the
population, deprive them of their most elementary civil rights, and
279
engage in all sorts of extortionary and corrupt practices."
Frangois Duvalier skillfully manipulated and exploited the United
States fear of Communism and Haiti's proximity to Cuba to wring
badly-needed aid from the United States.2 8 0 Throughout the long
relationship between Haiti and the United States, the United
States "assumed the responsibility for financing the Haitian
government through foreign aid, despite the knowledge of widespread fraudulent practices and misappropriation of public and
aid monies by government officials." 28 1 Misappropriations were
possible because the Duvaliers enjoyed absolute control over the
Ministerial apstate apparatuses and repressive forces.
pointments were made with an eye toward pleasing Washington,
though it was generally understood that ministers were not to
take their responsibilities seriously lest they jeopardize or expose
282
government corruption.
Haiti was not the only state in which the instruments and
weapons of repression financed by Western friends were pressed
into service by ruling elites to assist in the pillage of the economy.
In the twenty years Ferdinand Marcos was President of the Philippines, his state was tied to the United States by a web of treaty
arrangements dating back to the 1940s. 28 3 Under Marcos, the

278.
at 160.

See DEWIND & KINLEY, supra note 56, at 16-17; DUPuY, supra note 59,

279.

See DUPUY, supra note 59, at 160-161; DEWIND & KINLEY, supra note

56, at 17.

When Jean-Claude Duvalier succeeded his father in 1972, he too

quickly created his own elite military force, the Leopards, "equipped and trained

by the United States in counterinsurgency tactics." DUPUY, supranote 59, at 170.
280.
281.

DUPUY, supranote 59, at 166.
Id. at 169.

282.

Id. at 171.

283. Agreement Concerning Military Bases, March 14, 1947, U.S.-Phil., 61
Stat. 4019 (entered into force March 26, 1947); Agreement on Military Assistance
to the Philippines, March 21, 1947, U.S.-Phil., 61 Stat. 3282; Mutual Defense
Treaty, August 30, 1951, U.S.-Phil., 3 U.S.T. 3948; Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), September 8, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. 3170; see
also Paul M. Kattenburg, The CaseFor Ending the Special Relationship and Leaving
the United States Bases in the Philippines, in REBUILDING A NATION: PHILIPPINE
CHALLENGES AND AMERICAN POLICY 547, 549 (Carl H. Landds ed., 1987).
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Philippines was viewed as a longstanding treaty ally and a special
friend of the United States.2 8 4 Marcos used this "special friendship" to milk the United States for funds to combat

insurgencies--communist

and

otherwise--that

plagued

his

administration. United States military aid went to the equipment
and training of Philippine counter-insurgency forces. 28 5 In addition to this overt official military assistance, an estimated $500
million was pumped annually into the Philippines economy in the
form of wages and other expenses related to the operation of
United States naval and air force bases.2 8 6 Much of the aid was
misused or stolen, 28 7 while the insurgencies grew because the
insurgencies were "stimulated by economic hardship, exacerbated
by tyrannies of the Marcos government ... 288
*"

2. Privileged Treatment for Heads of State Guilty of Spoliation
Western complicity in these acts of depredation is also
evidenced in the treatment deposed dictators receive from their
allies in the West. When the end finally came for Duvalier and
Marcos, for instance, both were flown out of their respective
states on U.S. Air Force planes with their family members, close
associates, and in
the case of Jean-Claude
Duvalier,
bodyguards. 28 9 Neither man was forced to endure a Ulyssean
odyssey in search of a safe harbor to take refuge. Contrast this
reception with the treatment routinely meted out to the Haitian
boat people heading for United States shores or Filipino
"economic refugees" in Kuwait. The latter, fleeing the wrenching
poverty and hardship that Marcos had inflicted on them, have
eagerly accepted the most menial jobs; meanwhile, they stoically

,284.
See William M. Wise, The PhilippineMilitaryAfter Marcos, in REBUILDING
A NAION, supranote 283, at 435, 447.
285.
See L. Stull, Moments of Truth in Philppine-American Relations: The
Carter Years, in REBUILDING A NATION, supranote 283, at 517, 520; see also Alva
M. Bowen, Jr., The Philippine-American Defense Partnership, in REBUILDING A
NATION, supra note 283, at 449, 453.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 524.
288.
Bowen, supra note 285, at 453; see also Lela G. Noble, Muslim
Grievances and the Muslim Rebellion, in REBUILDING A NATION, supra note 283, at
417.

289. See DEWIND & KINLEY, supra note 56, at 150; see also John Bresnan,
Prefacein CRISIS INTHE PHILIPPINES: THE MARCOS ERA AND BEYOND xi (John Bresnan
ed., 1986).
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endure physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their
hosts.
B.

The Needfor a Concerted International
Response to the Problem

1. The Inability of International Law to Deter the Perpetrators
A concerted international response to this situation is
necessary. Individuals who engage in indigenous spoliation tend

to flee their states to seek refuge in other states, placing them
well beyond the jurisdictional reach of their national courts. As
long as these fugitives are on the run, extradition or abduction
remains the only available avenue for repatriating them so they
can stand trial. However, both methods have proved difficult to
accomplish in the past.2 90 Several factors account for the inadequacy of these two methods: (1) the absence of an extradition
treaty between victim-state and asylum-state; (2) even if an
extradition treaty exists, the crime of indigenous spoliation is
2 91
most likely not one of the enumerated extraditable offenses;
and (3) the international doctrines of sovereign immunity and act
of state continue to provide a convenient wall behind which chief
executives involved in indigenous spoliation may hide.
If these stolen funds stand any chance of being recaptured
and repatriated, some basis must be found for piercing the veil of
the sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines. In this regard,
traditional notions of sovereignty 2 9 must give way when human

290.

States harboring these fugitives have been very reluctant to extradite

them and have routinely refused such requests from other governments. See
Brazilian High Court Rejects ParaguayExtradition Request, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1,
1990, at 4; GUARDIAN, June 9, 1966, July 27, 1966, July 28, 1966; TIMES
(London), April 29, 1966. For more on the Dikko affair, see Martin Wainwright,
Stephen Cook & Michael Smith, Mercenary team held for Dikko abduction,
GUARDIAN, July 7, 1984, p. 1; Patrick Smith, Nigerians amused by kidnapping
attempt, GUARDIAN, July 7, 1984, at 2; Editorial, To Lagos by special delivery,
GUARDIAN, July 7, 1984, at 12; David Pallister & Ad'Obe, Twenty-one reasonswhy
Nigeria wants Dikko, GUARDIAN, Saturday July 7, 1984, 17.
291.
Under the requirement of "double criminality," spoliation must be
characterized as an offense punishable under the law of both states. See
generally, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INr'L L. 81-86 (1935);

OPPENHEIM'S INIERNAIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 958 (HERSCH LAUIERPACHT, ed., 1955).

292.

There is a pressing need for a reassessment of the concept of

sovereignty in a world that has increasingly become a global village. In an implicit
recognition that we are all "thy brother's keeper," states have implicitly waived or

surrendered part of their sovereignty to others: the vast majority of states in
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and now Central and Eastern Europe
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lives are at stake, as they are in cases of patrimonicide, or
indigenous spoliation. The consequences of indigenous spoliation
are so dire that national sensitivities must not be allowed to stand
in the way of efforts to capture and punish those guilty of such
acts.
Generally, the sovereign immunity and act of state
doctrines should be entitled to some deference.
However, in
compelling circumstances, courts should treat them as flimsy
veils and not as impenetrable barriers. 2 9 3 These doctrines could
not have been intended to exculpate the nefarious activities
associated with patrimonicide.
Clearly, a redefinition is required.
Such an exercise is

already under way as courts now make an exception for sovereign
activities deemed commercial. 29 4 Evidence culled from reports of
commissions of inquiry worldwide paints a picture of some heads
of states and other high-ranking officials as nothing more than
politicians-turned-businessmen. 2 95 In Latin America, just as in
Africa, heads of states have routinely used state resources to
build an economic base and to operate in the marketplace as
29 6
entrepreneurs. President Trujillo of the Dominican Republic
took over the state's only shoe factory and then proceeded to
issue a decree forbidding anyone in the capital from going
barefoot. 2 97 Moreover, Cuba's onetime President Gomez 2 98 is

can hardly survive without economic handouts from the major economic powers
(United States, European Community, and Japan) and loans from the leading
multilateral lending agencies (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.).
Donor states and lending agencies are increasingly using their enormous financial
leverage in the receiving states to legislate in areas previously regarded as the
exclusive domain of the sovereign, even to the point of rewriting their
constitutions. See, e.g., Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority:
The World Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RIS. J.
159 (1993).
293.
See Anthony DAmato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response
to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INr'L L. 516 (1990). Indigenous spoliation touches on the
fundamental right of a people to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources
and economic output and their right to be the principal beneficiaries of their
national wealth. When these fundamental human rights are trampled, legal
formalisms must not be used to deny the victims an opportunity to seek redress.
In this vein, when the doctrine of sovereign immunity is placed in its proper
historical perspective, it turns out to be a doctrine of expediency promoted by a
court to protect some very definite state interests. See W. Michael Reisman,
Incidents in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTIHOLOGY 53, 57 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
294.
See supra part lI.A.2.
295.
See FIRST, supranote 49, at 96.
296.
Trujillo served as president from 1930 to 1961.
297.
See Whitehead, supra note 13, at 148. The shoe business also
attracted Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister in Nigeria's First Republic
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reputed to have run his state as "the private preserve of his own
family and the army."2 9 9

Therefore, to the extent that heads of state and other highranking officials involved in indigenous spoliation use the stolen
wealth in running commercial ventures, they should be treated as

politicians-turned-businessmen.

Thus, they should not be

eligible for protection under the various sovereign immunity
doctrines.
2. Spoliated Capital Invested in Western Economies
Much of the spoliated wealth is banked or invested in states
that have been all too willing to grant asylum to the perpetrators
of these acts. These states are just as much a part of the problem
3°
because their gain is the loss of the victim-states. 0 However,
the investfrom
viewed from a broader perspective, the gains
ments of the stolen wealth are short-term. Taxpayers in the
asylum states ultimately pay far more to bail out states than do
the victims of indigenous spoliation. Furthermore, the benefits
the host
resulting from investing spoliated funds in
economy-employment generation, infrastructure development,
and provision of social services-are also short-term. As capital
flees the developing states, it leaves behind impoverished
consumers who cannot afford to buy the goods produced in the
industrialized states. Without markets for their products, it is
only a matter of time before these developing economies begin to
feel the full impact of what was originally viewed as an external

problem.
3. The Absence of Autonomous Judiciaries in Victim States
Finally, international action is the only remedy because no

court in a victim-state would want to risk adjudicating a claim of
indigenous spoliation as long as the defendants are still in office
wielding enormous power. Finding an impartial court and equally
impartial judge who would agree to judge a sitting president or his

(1960-1966), who also opened a shoe factory "but not before he had legislated tax
relief for local industry and a tax on imported shoes." See FIRST, supranote 49, at
103.
President Gomez was in power from 1910 to 1935.
298.
See EDWIN LIEUWEN, VENEZUEIA 49 (1961).
299.
See SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBr 19-20 (1990); see also
300.
James S. Henry, Third World Debt Hoax: Where the Money Went, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, April 14, 1986, at 19.

108

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:45

closest associates would be difficult.3 0 1 The attitude of Haitian
courts with respect to the ancien regime is typical. While legal
actions were proceeding in France and the United States against
members of the Duvalier regime, the Haitian judiciary did
everything within its power to protect the remnants of a
discredited ancien regime.3 02
An African participant at the
Thirteenth Session of the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights reacted with some incredulity to the naive
suggestion that victims of human rights violations must first
exhaust all local remedies before bringing suit in an international
forum: "You taking (sic) an African head of state to court in your
country and you would be signing your death warrant." 30 3 Thus,
the only way to combat the problem of spoliation by chief executives and high-ranking officials is concerted international action.
C. Some PossibleSolutions

1. The Multilateral Treaty Approach
The international legal community can address the problem
of indigenous spoliation through a convention or treaty. In this
vein, Professor Reisman has proposed the drafting of an international declaration that would (1) characterize acts of spoliation by
national officials as a breach of national trust and international
law; (2) impose on other governments an obligation of supplying
information and cooperation; and (3) characterize the failure of
other governments to prevent such funds from being cached in
their jurisdiction and to aid in their recapture as complicity, after
the fact, and as an international delict. 3 ° 4 Treaties representing
the express consent of state parties to be bound by their under-

301. The issue of an appropriate tribunal to try crimes involving heads of
states and their close collaborators was also raised in the debates leading to the
adoption of the Genocide Convention. See Continuation of the Discussion on the
Draft Convention on Genocide:, U.N. ESCOR, 6th Comm., 195th plen. mtg., at 810,
U.N. Doc. A/760 (1948), revised by U.N. Doc. A/760/Corr. 2 (1948) (remarks by

Mr. Rafat). It is safe to presume that national tribunals will be powerless or too
tolerant to punish powerful friends of a sitting president proved to have spoliated
national funds.
302. See LAWYERS COMMflIEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PAPER LAWS, STEEL
BAYONES 27 (1990).
303. See K. Gyan-Apenteng, Defining the Terrain in Banju4 in WESr AFRIcA,
April 19-25, 1993, at 634, 635.
304. See Reisman, supranote 12.
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takings30 5 would occupy the 3 highest
rung in the hierarchy of
°6
international legal authorities.
Notwithstanding the fact that the primacy of international
conventions is settled, there are still some problems with this
approach, including the process of treaty-making itself. In the
absence of a world legislative body, international lawmaking
operates through multilateral diplomacy, a very tortuous and
drawn-out process. The history of postwar multilateral treaty
negotiation would suggest that reaching consensus in a timely
manner on a spoliation convention is highly unlikely. 3 7
Moreover, several factors may militate against the early signing of
a convention. Indigenous spoliation is a crime which benefits
some of the very members of the international community who
will be expected to draft a declaration proscribing such conduct.
Additionally, it would appear that some states are more injured
than others, and it may not be easy to convince everyone to share
the same sense of outrage as the victim states.
Even if an international declaration is feasible, the very idea
Is a
of a declaration leaves many questions unanswered.
declaration, as envisaged by its proponents, the same thing as a
treaty or convention to which the signatories are bound? Will it
come in the form of a General Assembly resolution?3 0 8 And will it
take the form of an aspirational or hortatory declaration with no
binding force? On the other hand, assuming such a resolution
serves to set forth principles for a future treaty, who would be
included among the persons subject to its proscriptions?
305. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
2(1)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333.
306. See STA'ITE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSICE, June 26, 1945,
art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
307. It has taken the International Law Commission over three decades to
put together a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
See supranotes 213-16 and accompanying text.
308. Publicists are divided on this issue with some arguing that such
declarations are legally binding on member states, while others see it differently.

The debate has generated an extensive literature. See Stephen M.Schwebel, The
Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. GeneralAssembly on CustomaryInternationalLaw,
PROCEEDINGS

OF THE 72ND ANNUAL

MEETING

OF THE AMERICAN

SOCIETY

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 301; Anthony D'Amato (Chair), Contemporary Views on the
Sources of International Law: The Effect of U.N. Resolutions on Emerging Legal
Norms, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1979, 300;
JORGE CASrANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NAI1ONS RESOLUTIONS (Alba Amola
trans., 1969); H. BOKER-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF IHE UNITED NATIONS ININTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION (1978); OBED Y. ASA-MOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966); Richard A.
Falk, On the Quasi-LegislativeCompetence of the GeneralAssembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 782 (1966); Cf. Guradze, Are Human Rights Resolutions of the United Nations
GeneralAssembly Law Making? 4 HUM. RTS. J. 456 (1971).
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2. Proscribing Indigenous Spoliation as a Condition for Foreign
Aid and Commercial Bank Credits
Major aid donors have increasingly included democratic
reforms and observance of human rights as conditions for
extending aid and credits to authoritarian and totalitarian
governments.3 °9 These donors should also condition financial
assistance on a proscription of indigenous spoliation and leadership incorruptibility. This goal can be accomplished in one of
three ways:
1.
By requiring extradition treaties between victim states and
states where spoliated wealth is banked or invested include
indigenous spoliation as an extraditable crime.
2.
Given the importance developing states attach to private
foreign investment, treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation, as well as bilateral investment treaties between
investment-starved developing states and capital-rich industrial
states,-should be drafted to include a provision to assist a
government that has been the victim of indigenous spoliation in
recovering and repatriating funds.

3.
Including in bilateral and multilateral Mutual Legal
Assistance on Criminal Matters Treaties a provision for the
recovery and return of spoliated wealth.

3. Getting Victim States Involved in the Prevention and Punishment of Indigenous Spoliation
Indigenous spoliation will continue unabated unless the
victim states are involved in the solution. Towards this end,
victim states should be encouraged to pass and enforce national
legislation for the prevention and punishment of persons guilty of
acts of indigenous spoliation. In this regard, Professor Ann-Marie
Burley has called for an international convention which, among
other things, would assist fragile democratic successor
governments to restore "the legitimacy and effectiveness of their
own judicial and political systems." 3 10 For such a convention to
be effective, it must include an obligation upon victim states to
incorporate in their national laws a provision imposing severe
penalties on persons guilty of acts of indigenous spoliation.

309.
See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1988) (prohibiting foreign assistance to
gross violators of human rights); 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1988) (prohibiting security
assistance to gross violators of human rights).
310.
See Pursuing the Assets of Forner Dictators, in ASIL PROCEEDINGS,

supranote 12, 394, 402 (comments by Anne-Marie Burley) [hereinafter Pursuing
the Assets of FormerDictators].
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Additionally, the convention should also establish national legal
guarantees
that
(1)
judgments
against
high-ranking
officials-including former heads of state-will be enforced, and
(2) the courts will not permit a deposed dictator to invoke
sovereign immunity or act of state defenses when the new
government requests such immunity to be revoked. Many African
states have taken the position that economic rights for individuals
and peoples take precedence over civil and political rights. For
these states, there can be no better barometer for measuring their
professed commitment to this principle than their willingness to
31
pass and enforce strict laws on leadership misconduct.
For many of these suggested solutions, Article 2(7) of the UN
Charter, prohibiting any meddling in the internal affairs of
member states, may present a problem. The argument has been
made that even discussion of a state's human rights violations is
prohibited by Article 2(7). This doctrine, which posits that only
states and not individuals are the proper subjects of international
law, has been blamed for the position taken by the American Bar
Association-that the United States could not ratify the Genocide
Convention 12 because it dealt with matters within the domestic
3 13
jurisdiction of the United States.
3 14
The steady erosion of this view has already been noted.
This change in perspective has been forced on the community of
states by several factors.3 1 5 First, the persistent violation of
human rights in some states has forced the victims of these
violations to appeal directly to the international community to
intervene in their states to put an end to their misery.3 16 Second,
there has been recognition of an emerging right to democracy:
the international community, in turn, is under an obligation to
protect this right by intervening in other states, if necessary, to

311.
See Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1986), U.N. ESCOR, 43rd
Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4/1987/7, reprinted in 9 HUMAN RTS. Q. 128, 143
(1987); WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FULIRE
(1987); On Human and People's Rights in Africa, OAU Document AHG/Dec. 115
(XVI) (emphasis added).
312.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered intoforce Jan. 12, 1951).
313.
See MALVINA HALBERSrAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS, AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? 50-52 (1987).
314.
See supranote 111 and accompanying text.

315. See generally Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being
PropelledTowards a People-Centered TransnationalLegal Order, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POLY 1 (1993).
316.
Such interventions have been viewed favorably by some international
law scholars. See Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful

Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INTLL. 516 (1990).
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prevent the overthrow of democratically elected governments.
This emerging right has undermined the notion of the
impregnability of sovereignty.3 17 Finally, the shifting role of the
major multilateral agencies-the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)-from a merely lending role to
an increasingly law-making institution, able and willing to dictate
fundamental institutional
change in the borrowing states through
3 18
their lending policies.
The World Bank's principal tool in nudging borrowing
members
towards
prescribed
social
objectives
is
"conditionality."3 19
Bank loans impose conditions requiring

legislative and policy changes by borrowing governments. 320 The
World Bank has taken the position that its governance concerns
include: broad macroeconomic policy, the proper structure and
role of government institutions that administer the economy,
3 21
environmental impacts, and even military spending.
Indigenous spoliation is injurious to the economic well-being
of a state because it drains the state of scarce but vital resources
needed for economic development. This activity clearly falls
within the World Bank's governance role. Therefore, the Bank
should include in its loan agreements specific requirements for
the repatriation of spoliated wealth in foreign accounts held by
high-ranking officials of the borrowing governments.
317. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); The Situationof Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti,
U.N. GAOR 46th Sess., Agenda Item 145, U.N. Doc. A/46/LS/Rev.1 (1991)
(demanding the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti following his overthrow
by a military coup in Sept. 1991); Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti
OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RESJI/91, corr. 1, paras. 5,6 (1991).
318. In a recent article, Dr. David N. Plank meticulously examines the
impact of World Bank and IMF programs of structural adjustment and sectoral
policy reform on Mozambique. David N. Plank, Aid, Debt, and the End of
Sovereignty: Mozambique andIts Donors, 31 J. MOD. APR. STUD. 407 (1993),
319. For the origins of the concept of conditionality, see JOSEPH GOLD,
CONDITONALrIY (1979); MANUEL GUITTAN, FUND CONDTIONALrIY: EVOLUTION OF
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1981); John Williamson, Introduction, in IMF
CONDITIONALITY xiii (John Williamson ed., 1983).
320. See PAUL MOSLEY, JANE HARRIGAN & JOHN TOYE, 1 AID AND POWER: THE
WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING: ANALYSIS AND POLICY PROPOSALS 66-77
(1979).
321. WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENr 46 (1992); see also WORLD
BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 60-61 (1989) (the
issue of borrowing members' governance raised for the first time whereupon Bank
publicly called upon African governments to become accountable to their

citizens).
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4. Treating Indigenous Spoliation as More Than a Property
Dispute

The

preceding

solutions

treat

indigenous

spoliation

essentially as a property dispute.3 2 2 But it is much more. Such
acts arguably belong in the category of human rights violations.
When the wealth and natural resources of a state are diverted by
its leadership, the citizens are deprived of their right to full use
and enjoyment of the resources. The right of a people not to be
dispossessed of their wealth and natural resources is not just any
ordinary human right, but the fundamental human right. This
right transcends all the other rights and gives some semblance of
form and shape to-and in a very real sense qualifies-the other
rights. In this sense, other human rights are not on the same
plane.
Acts of indigenous spoliation violate fundamental human
A people's enjoyment of the other rights within the
rights.
pantheon of human rights is dependent on their access to
national wealth. One cannot talk realistically of a fundamental
right to life when this life can barely be sustained because it is
cut off from the most basic necessities of food, shelter, and
medical care. The right of access to national wealth must be
protected because it guarantees the enjoyment of the other rights
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Those who seek to
promote and protect fundamental human rights can do no better
than to ensure that the national wealth is not spoliated by public
officials. After all, the quality of life-whether it will be a dignified
one or not-hangs precariously on the availability of a state's
resources and the people's right of access to them.
In this vein, acts of indigenous spoliation should be viewed as
23
which applies
an extension of the Filartiga principle,3
international law to violations of human rights in domestic
courts.3 2 4 However, even in the egregious case of the Marcoses,
lawyers for the Philippine government had a difficult time

establishing that the law of nations is violated when a head of
state steals virtually all his state's wealth. However, elevating

322. This view was expressed by Peter Weiss, one of the lawyers who
represented the Philippines Government in the Marcos cases. He thought that
those cases were not property disputes but rather human rights cases. See
Pursuing the Assets of FormerDictators,supra note 310, at 394, 396-98 (remarks

by Peter Weiss).
323. Id. at 397.
324. This principle provides that certain human rights principles have
ripened into customary law and therefore constitute part of the law of the United
States. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1980).
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indigenous spoliation to the level of a human rights violation 3 2 s
transforms it into an obligation erga omnes, which entitles any
state to bring an action before its courts against high-ranking
officials who engage in acts of spoliation under the color of the
3 26

law.

The following developments support the view that the
community of states has an affirmative duty to intervene to
prevent acts of indigenous spoliation in states where these have
occurred or are occurring: the willingness of victims of human
rights violations to invite foreign governments to intervene in their
states to stop such violations;3 2 7 the widespread recognition by
the world community of an emerging right to democracy and the
duty that it imposes on the international community to enforce
this right; and the increasing interventionist policy of the major
multilateral funding agencies.

VII. CONCLUSION

In The Warriors, J. Glenn Gray's sensitive memoir of World
War II, Gray proposes a principle for fixing responsibility for
collective acts by suggesting that: "[t]he greater the possibility of
free action in the communal sphere, the greater the degree of guilt

325.
Indigenous spoliation can be included among the list of crimes against
the peace and security of mankind enumerated in Part II of the 1991 ILC Draft
Code of Crimes, supranote 213.
326.
In the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice
elaborated on the concept of obligations erga omnes when it said:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a

State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising

vis-&-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international
law, from the... rules concerning the basic rights of the human person..
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 4,33.

327.

See U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688

(1991); see generally Michael Stopford, HumanitarianAssistance in the Wake of the

PersianGulf War, 33 VA. J. INTr L. 491 (1993).
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for evil deeds done in the name of everyone."3 28 It would appear
that what the philosopher has in mind is moral, not merely legal,
responsibility. Furthermore, his overriding concern, according3 to
29
Michael Joseph Smith, is with conscience, not strict liability.

For Gray and Smith, the conception of moral responsibility
extends well beyond the provisions of the legal code. What
determines one's responsibility in the moral sense is the degree of
freedom to act-or "free action"-that one enjoys in a given
sphere.3 0 Responsibility must be fixed within the limits of one's
freedom to act.
If Gray's notion of freedom to alter things is central to the
fixing of moral responsibility, then an important distinction can
be made between leaders and citizens. Regardless of how free
citizens should act in the communal sphere, the acts of their
leaders carry far greater consequences. Because leaders qua
leaders assume far greater power, they also bear far greater moral
responsibility.331 Thus, a second proposition that flows logically
from Gray's principle of free action is that political leaders act not
as personal agents, but as trustees for their states. Since they
act on behalf of the collective, it is incumbent on them to consider
the consequences of their actions not simply from the perspective
of their narrow self-interest but, perhaps more importantly from
the view of the state and its collective interests.332 This view is
leaders must
consistent with Max Weber's injunction that true
33 3
adopt an ethic of consequence and responsibility.
This Article set out to call attention to a serious problem
worthy of elevation to the level of international concern. A state's
wealth is whittled down to a fraction of its former size as a result
of planned, organized, systematic, and deliberate diversions by its
public officials and their close associates. This problem is not
limited to the celebrated Marcos cases that attracted so much
international press coverage; it is widespread in contemporary
societies. As Professor Tignor, a leading Africanist, points out:
"the frequent regime changes which have occurred in Africa in the

328. J. GLENN GRAY, THE WARRIORS: REFLECTIONS ON MEN IN BATrLE 199
(1959).
329.
See MoralReasoning, supra note 252, at 33.
330.
See GRAY, supranote 328, at 199.
331.
MoralReasoning, supranote 252, at 33.
332.
GRAY, supra note 328, at 34. Gray also makes the point that a leader's
moral responsibility is dictated by the context of uncertainty wherein the leader
operates. Although leaders seek and hold greater power and greater responsibility than the citizens they rule, nevertheless "they operate under
circumstances that make purely ethical action quite difficult" Id. at 35.
333.
Id.; see also Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 122 (H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1946).
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last several decades have been accompanied by charges of gross
administrative malfeasance and promises to introduce honest
government."3- 4 In states that have been victims of looting on a
massive scale, indigenous spoliation has become the single most
important obstacle to economic development. 3 35 In each of the
states mentioned in this Article, the confusion of public finance
with private financial interests of office-holders has had fatal
consequences for the vast majority of the population. This
tradition of plundering the national treasury has brought about
human suffering on a tragic scale, rolled 'back the little gains in
who advocate
economic advancement, and given ground to those
336
a return to the age of paternalistic colonial rule.
What has taken place in the last three decades is planned,
organized, and deliberate looting on a massive scale, as never
All who have commented on this
before seen in history.
phenomenon tend to use the same vocabulary in describing this
unprecedented movement of national wealth from states that can
least afford such extensive financial hemorrhage into private accounts in capital-rich states for safekeeping. There seems to be
general agreement that while corruption is nothing new in these
societies, contemporary graft by high-ranking officials is so
unique that our usual vocabulary cannot adequately describe it.
"Patrimonicide" and "indigenous spoliation" have been offered
as substitutes. They are intended to call to mind pillage or

plunder that is systematic and organized-accomplished often by
forcible, questionable, and dishonest means. Usually such acts of
looting are committed by an enemy. However, this genre of
spoliation differs in that it is practiced by people indigenous to the
states. Even worse is the fact that those responsible are the men
and women who eagerly sought and obtained public office or had
it thrust upon them; these are not marauding hordes of armed
bandits bent on sacking and destroying property belonging to the
enemy.
Furthermore, the looting is directed at all the
wealth-generating sectors of the economy. As a result, the
consequences on society as a whole are long-lasting.

334.

Robert L. Tignor, Political Corruptionin NigeriaBefore Independence, 3i

J. MOD. AFR. SUD. 175-76 (1993).

335.

Id.; see also Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A

Cost-Benefit Analysis, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

564 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed., 1989); ROBERT WILLIAMS, POLITICAL CORRUPTION
INAFRICA (1987).
336. See Paul Johnson, Colonialism's Back-and Not a Moment Too Soon,
N.Y. TIMES MAO., Apr. 18, 1993, at 22, 43-44.
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Constitutionally

responsible

rulers

should

be

held

individually accountable before the law of nations for their acts of
spoliation. Achieving this goal will require adopting the approach
of the Genocide Convention and the Nuremberg war crimes
This development would open the door for
prosecutions.
individual criminal liability to attach to those who engage in the
proscribed acts. In addition, following the Nuremberg strategy,
courts in the place where these activities occur, as well as the
courts of any state where spoliated funds are found or an accused
is given sanctuary, would have jurisdiction. This approach was
adopted by the drafters of the Convention on Apartheid. The
decision to criminalize apartheid had as its objective, viewed from
the perspective of criminal theory, to capture "both the symbolic
and the deterrent aspects of criminal law."33 7 The emphasis on
the criminal nature of the deed was intended to symbolize "the
heinous nature" of the conduct in the view of the international
community.3 3 8 The international community ought to take the
same position with respect to acts of indigenous spoliation. The
be
spoliator, like the pirate3 3 9 and slave trader before him, should
34
regarded as hostis humani generis, an enemy of manldnd.

337. See Roger S. Clark, The Crime of Apartheid, in 1 INTERNATfONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: CRIMES 299, 301 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1986).
338. Id.
339. The story is often told of a famous pirate named Dionides who was
caught and brought before Alexander the Great. Asked by Alexander why he had
arrogated to himself the empire of the seas, Dionides replied with a question:
"Why do yourself sack the earth?" "I am king," said Alexander, "while you are only
a pirate." Dionides then shot back: "What matters is the name. The business is
the same for both of us. Dionides ravages the ships and Alexander the empire. If
the Gods had made me Alexander and had made you Dionides, perhaps I would
be a better prince than you would be a good pirate." See N.N. SES IER, LA
PIRATERIE DANS L'ANTIQUTIE 268 (1900), quoted in Jacob W.F. Sundberg, The

Crime of Piracy in INERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 441 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1986). The story reveals the razor-thin edge that separates the ancient
behavior of pirates from contemporary acts of indigenous spoliation. Both crimes
are equally odious and deservedly targets of international conventional regulation.
340. In the Lotus CaseJudge Moore stated in his dissent that:
[I]n the case of what is known as piracy by law of nations, there has been
conceded a universal jurisdiction, under which the person charged with
the offence may be tried and punished by any nation into whose jurisdiction he may come ....
Though statutes may provide for its punishment, it is an offence
against the law of nations; and as the scene of the pirate's operations is
the high seas, which it is not the right or duty of any nation to police, he is
denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is treated as an
outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind-hostis humanis generis--whom any
nation may in the interest of all capture and punish.
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The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No. 9, at 70. The principle of
universal jurisdiction articulated by Judge Moore applies to crimes that are
committed typically in res communis. However, it also applies to conduct that is
"recognized to constitute such a grave affront to the international community that
any State having custody over the author has a right to prosecute regardlessof
the locus delicti or the nationality of the offender.' LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 103
(1992). It is in this sense that universal jurisdiction can be invoked to try and
punish leaders who commit acts of indigenous spoliation.

